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In the course of their various productions, the news and entertain-
ment media' frequently portray real people without authorization. The
public policy embodied in the First Amendment 2 protects, and may
even encourage, such portrayals; they are regarded as "an essential in-
cident of life in a society which places primary value on freedom of
speech and press." 3 But unauthorized publicity can cause those por-
trayed substantial harm; it may disrupt their lives,4 hurt their feel-
ings, 5 or decrease their ability to profit from their names, likenesses or
other attributes.6 As a result, there is a countervailing public policy
that such harm should not be permitted. The portrayal of real people
by the media thus brings two important public policies into conflict.
Courts have responded to this conflict by attempting to define a
series of rights enabling individuals to enjoin or to recover damages
for unauthorized portrayals. 7 To the traditional cause of action for
t- Partner, Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison, New York, New York.
+ Law Clerk to the Honorable Jon 0. Newman, Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit.
1. The term "media" will be used broadly in this article, to include any medium for
transmission of a portrayal to the public-newspapers, magazines, motion pictures, tele-
Nision, posters, and commercial products. A portrayal may be defined as any generally
disseminated representation of a natural person.
2. U.S. CONsar. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law . . .abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press .. ")
3. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967).
4. E.g., Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 4 Cal. 3d 529, 483 P.2d 34, 93 Cal. Rptr. 866
(1971) (defendant's revelation of plaintiff's past crime causes estrangement of daughter).
5. E.g., Barber v. Time, Inc., 348 Mo. 1199, 159 S.V.2d 291 (1942) (description of
unusual ailment embarrasses victim).
6. E.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977) (broad-
cast of performance impairs performer's ability to earn living as entertainer).
7. See, e.g., Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
99 S. Ct. 1215 (1979) (injunctive relief); Barber v. Time, Inc., 348 Mo. 1199, 159 S.V.2d
291 (1942) (money damages).
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libel, two newer rights have been added, the "right of privacy" and the
"right of publicity."9 Some courts have exhibited a certain sophistica-
tion in recognizing that the identification of such rights merely states
a legal conclusion, and does not, by itself, provide a full set of legal
principles for granting relief.10 The courts have been less successful,
however, in determining precisely what the legal principles protecting
people from unauthorized portrayals should be. The principles that
have been offered thus far are unclear, and often fail to provide an
adequate explanation for the results that the courts have reached.
The absence of articulated principles, however, does not mean that
the decisions have been random, or that no principles can be dis-
covered. This article will demonstrate that courts are guided by certain
well-accepted and clearly identifiable social policies in resolving con-
flicts over media portrayals. It will further demonstrate that coherent
legal principles can be derived from those policies, and that these
principles, although infrequently articulated by the courts, account for
the prevailing pattern of court decisions. The article proposes that the
terms "privacy" and "publicity" should be abandoned in the analysis
of media portrayal cases, and replaced with an explicit recognition of
the principles that courts actually use.
I. The Present Law Regarding Media Portrayals
This century has seen substantial growth in the legal protection af-
forded individuals who are unwillingly portrayed by the media.
Previously, the principal protection was provided by the law of libel."
8. See Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). The in-
jury involved is conceived as being a violation of the person's right "to be let alone."
This term was first used in T. COOLEY, LAW oF ToRTs 29 (2d ed. 1888). It was then quoted
in Warren & Brandeis, supra, at 195.
9. See Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953). The injury involved is conceived as the misappro-
priation of a person's economic interest in his name, likeness, characteristics or activities.
10. See, e.g., Carson v. National Bank of Commerce Trust & Say., 501 F.2d 1082, 1084-
85 (8th Cir. 1974); Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866,
868 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953).
11. See 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 677-79 (1956); W. PROSSER, HAND-
BOOK OF THE LAW Or ToRTs § 117, at 802 (4th ed. 1971).
The copyright laws are also relevant to the modern media, but they have only limited
applicability to portrayals. To be sure, they protect artistic creations, see 17 U.S.C.
§ 201(a) (1976) ("Copyright in a work . . . vests initially in the author or authors of the
work.") Few portrayals, however, aside from stage or motion picture simulations of per-
formers, rely on verbatim presentations of an author's works. Those aspects of a person
that are most likely to be portrayed-his name, likeness, characteristics and life history-
are excluded from copyright protection by the new statute, id. § 102(a) ("Copyright
protection subsists .. . in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of
expression...."), and may well be beyond the constitutional limits of the copyright
clause, see 1 N ,IMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.08[c] (1978) [hereinafter cited as NIMMER].
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But the development of the mass media, combined with a recognition
of the limits of libel law, stimulated the articulation of new legal
rights. The first of these, dating from the end of the last century, was
the "right of privacy." Within the last few decades, a second approach
has been developed, based on the idea of a "right of publicity." Today,
these two rights provide the basis for a number of the suits against the
media for the portrayal of real people.
The new rights have not proven to be satisfactory, however, as legal
rationales for granting recovery. The case law has failed to articulate
their boundaries, their operation, or even their basic nature with any
degree of precision. In addition, recent decisions have introduced a
similar instability into the previously well-established law of libel. The
primary explanation for the lack of clarity in the current law of media
portrayals is the failure of all three rationales-libel, privacy, and
publicity-to include within their frameworks the First Amendment
considerations that are inevitably involved when suits are brought
against the media. As a result, the First Amendment must be brought
in by the court as an external limitation on rights that have been de-
fined in isolation from it. Treated in this way, the First Amendment,
like any other deus ex machina, produces uncertainties and distortions
in what should be a logical, coherent structure.
A. Libel Law and Media Portrayals
The law of libel is the most venerable basis for remedies against
media portrayals, and it provides powerful protection in certain situa-
tions -.12 There have always been substantial limitations on the reach
of libel law, however; it extends only to statements that harm a
person's reputation in the community, 13 and its protection can be
Furthermore, any brief quotation from artistic works that a portrayal may incorporate
is likely to be protected by the doctrine of "fair use," now codified at 17 U.S.C. § 107
(1976). See, e.g., Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir.
1966) (biography of Howard Hughes based partially on copyrighted articles protected by
fair use doctrine).
12. See generally I F. HAR'ER & F. JAmEs, supra note 11, 349-473; W. PROSSER, supra note
11, § 111. Libel law is the branch of defamation law dealing with statements that are
embodied in tangible form. See id. § 112, at 753. Media portrayals clearly fall within this
category, with the exception of those that are broadcast; even in this latter group, the
common judicial response has been to consider broadcast defamation as libel, see, e.g.,
Wanamaker v. Lewis, 173 F. Supp. 126 (D.D.C. 1959).
13. See, e.g., Cardillo v. Doubleday & Co., 518 F.2d 638, 639-40 (2d Cir. 1975) (for
multiple offender presently serving 21-year sentence at federal penitentiary, no statement
about criminal associations would damage reputation sufficiently to be considered libel-
ous); W. PROSSER, supra note 11, § Ill, at 739-44. Compare Wandt v. Hearst's Chicago
American, 129 Wis. 419, 109 N.W. 70 (1906) (statement that person has attempted suicide
is libelous) with Cardiff v. Brooklyn Eagle, Inc., 190 Misc. 730, 75 N.Y.S.2d 222 (Sup. Ct.
1947) (statement that person is dead is not libelous).
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claimed only by living persons.' 4 In addition, a variety of privileges
and defenses shield defendants against libel actions, of which the most
important are the privilege of fair comment on matters of "public
interest,"' 5 and the defense that the statement in question is true.'"
These privileges and defenses have traditionally placed many aspects
of portrayals beyond the reach of libel law.' As has been frequently
observed, the concept of libel simply does not take into account the
enormous power and variety of the modem media.' 8
In recent years, the scope of libel law has been further limited by a
series of Supreme Court decisions specifying the degree of fault that
must be demonstrated before recovery will be granted. The result of
these cases has been not only to limit libel law, but also to confuse it. It
is clear that the Supreme Court has abolished strict liability for libel, at
least where media defendants are concerned, and replaced it with a
standard requiring proof of either actual malice or negligence. 19 But
the Court has further held that the choice between these degrees of fault
will depend on whether the plaintiff is a "public figure" or a "private
figure." 20 Some commentators consider this approach excessively restric-
tive of First Amendment freedom, 2' while others regard it as excessively
lenient,22 but virtually all agree that it is excessively vague.2 3 The
Court has suggested three features characterizing public figures-as-
14. See, e.g., Insull v. New York World-Telegram Corp., 172 F. Supp. 615, 635 (N.D.
I1. 1959) (dictum) (citing cases); Kelly v. Johnson Publishing Co., 160 Cal. App. 2d 718,
721-25, 325 P.2d 659, 662-64 (1958).
15. See, e.g., Fisher v. Washington Post Co., 212 A.2d 335 (D.C. App. 1965); Catalfo
v. Shenton, 102 N.H. 47, 149 A.2d 871 (1959). See generally Thayer, Fair Comment As A
Defense, 1950 Wis. L. REv. 288.
16. See, e.g., Cowman v. LaVine, 234 N.W.2d 114, 125 (Iowa 1975) (dictum); Cochrane
v. Wittbold, 359 Mich. 402, 409, 102 N.W.2d 459, 463 (1960); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 581A (1976).
17. For example, the disclosure of truthful information about a person's private af-
fairs, the presentation of favorable or neutral distortions of his life, or the use of any
medium or mode of presentation that he finds distasteful all lie outside the ambit of
libel law. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 8, at 195-98.
18. See generally Harrett & Thornton, The Truth Hurts: A Critique of a Defense to
Defamation, 35 VA. L. Rav. 425 (1949); Silver, Libel, The "Higher Truths" of Art, and
the First Amendment, 126 U. PA. L. R1v. 1065 (1978); Warren & Brandeis, supra note 8.
19. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
20. See Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 47 U.S.L.W. 4827 (U.S. June 26, 1979); Wolston v.
Reader's Digest Ass'n, 47 U.S.L.W. 4840 (U.S. June 26, 1979); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
418 U.S. 323 (1974).
21. See, e.g., Note, The Editorial Function and the Gertz Public Figure Standard, 87
YALE L.J. 1723 (1978).
22. See, e.g., Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND.
L.J. 1 (1971).
23. See, e.g., Hill, Defamation and Privacy Under the First Amendment, 76 COLUht.
L. REv. 1205, 1213-19 (1976); Wellington, On Freedom of Expression, 88 YALE L.J. 1105,
1113 n.39 (1979); Note, supra note 21, at 1742-45.
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sumption of risk, access to the media, and participation in a public
controversy.2 4 Of these, however, the first is often regarded as an un-
fortunate legal fiction in the general law of torts, 25 and thus constitutes
a poor analytic tool for making constitutional distinctions; the second
does not correspond to the results of the cases, as it would include the
wealthy and the powerful, but exclude those who were outspoken but
obscure;26 and the third is precisely the test that the Court itself
abandoned as being too vague.2 7 As a result, the standard of fault that
a given plaintiff must establish in a libel suit is frequently unclear.
In any event a majority of the portrayals that were beyond the
reach of libel law when the recent constitutional adjudication started
remain beyond it now. Thus many individuals who find their portrayal
by the media objectionable must look to the law of privacy or of
publicity for protection.
B. The Right of Privacy
The right of privacy has emerged as a leading basis on which courts
will grant recovery for media portrayals. Despite a few earlier cases, the
concept is generally regarded as owing its origin to Samuel Warren's
and Louis Brandeis' famous 1890 law review article,28 in which the
authors attempted to establish that the right of privacy was part of the
existing common law; in the process of searching for this right, they
succeeded in inventing it. During the decades that followed, the
majority of states recognized the right of privacy as part of their com-
mon law.2 9 In New York, where the courts refused to do so, 3 ° the right
24. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344-45 (1974).
25. See, e.g., Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attractions, Inc., 31 N.J. 44, 48-57, 155 A.2d
90, 93-97 (1959) (assumption of risk not separate concept; refers either to consent or to
contributory negligence); James, Assumption of Risk: Unhappy Reincarnation, 78 YALE L.J.
185 (1968).
26. In fact, the cases suggest precisely the opposite result. See Time, Inc. v. Firestone,
424 U.S. 448 (1976) (wealthy, socially prominent person is private figure); Curtis Publish-
ing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 140-41, 155 (1967) (plurality opinion) (retired general who
spoke to crowd during riot is public figure); cf. Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F.2d
806 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 711 (1940) (in privacy context, impoverished, reclusive
person who was public figure as child remains so as adult).
27. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 352 (1974). It has been widely
argued, however, that the public interest concept, -see Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.,
403 U.S. 29 (1971) (plurality opinion), remains at the core of the Court's present test,
despite the Court's purported rejection of it. See Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448,
487-88 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Hill, supra note 23, 1217-19; Note, Public Figures,
Private Figures and Public Interest, 30 STAN. L. Rav. 157, 175-78 (1977).
28. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 8. For discussion of this article's seminal role, see
M. SLOUGH, PRIvACy, FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILiTY 27-42 (1969).
29. See W. PROSSER, supra note 11, § 117, at 803. The right of privacy was included in
REsTATEMENT OF TORTS § 867 (1939).
30. Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902).
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was established by legislative enactment.8 1 At present, recognition of
the right of privacy is virtually universal; when the Eighth Circuit, in
a diversity case, found itself constrained to hold that no such right
existed in Nebraska, it conceded that this situation was clearly aber-
rational.
3 2
The general agreement that the right of privacy exists, however, has
not been matched by similar unanimity about what the right of privacy
includes. The classic definition, employed by Warren and Brandeis,
is that it is based on "the right 'to be let alone.' ",33 That makes a pass-
ably good slogan, but it is not particularly helpful as a definition, being
vaguer than the term it purports to define. A more detailed effort is
Dean Prosser's widely quoted statement: "the law of privacy com-
prises four distinct kinds of invasion of four different interests of the
plaintiff, which are tied together by the common name, but otherwise
have almost nothing in common except that each represents an inter-
ference with the right of the plaintiff 'to be let alone.' -34 Prosser's four
invasions are: (1) intrusion upon physical solitude; (2) public disclosure
of private facts; (3) publicity that places someone in a false light; and
(4) appropriation of one's name or likeness for another's benefit.3 5
31. 1903 N.Y. Laws ch. 132, §§ 1-2, codified as amended, N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-52
(McKinney 1976). Four other states have statutory privacy rights of various dimensions.
See MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 214, § lB (Michie/Law. Co-op Cum. Supp. 1978); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21, §§ 839-40 (West 1978); R.I. GEN. LAws § 9-1-28 (Cum. Supp. 1978); VA. CODE
§ 18.2-216.1 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
The New York statute differs somewhat from the common law right of privacy, most
notably in that it extends exclusively to publications that use the person's name or like-
ness, and that are designed for "advertising" or "purposes of trade." New York courts
have emphasized that privacy suits must rest on statutory grounds. See, e.g., Kiss v. County
of Putnam, 59 A.D.2d 773, 398 N.Y.S.2d 729 (1977). Nonetheless, the importance of New
York law has meant that New York cases, even though based on statute, have often been
regarded as leading precedents, and have become part of the common law tradition. See,
e.g., Commonwealth v. Wiseman, 356 Mass. 251, 259, 261, 249 N.E.2d 610, 616, 617 (1969),
cert. denied, 398 U.S. 960 (1970) (citing New York cases); Palmer v. Schonhorn Enterprises,
Inc., 96 N.J. Super. 72, 78-79, 232 A.2d 458, 461-62 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1967) (same);
Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF, L. REV. 383, 385-86 (1960) ("Except as the statute itself limits
the extent of the right, the New York decisions are quite consistent with the common
law as it has been worked out in other states .. ") See generally Landis, Statutes and the
Sources of Law, in HARVARD LEGAL ESSAYS 21 (1934) (incorporation of statutory rules into
common law).
32. Carson v. National Bank of Commerce Trust & Say., 501 F.2d 1082, 1085 (8th Cir.
1974). Only two other states, Minnesota and Wisconsin, refuse to recognize the right of
privacy by either common law or statute. See Hendry v. Conner, 303 Minn. 317, 319, 226
N.W.2d 921, 923 (1975); Slawek v. Stroh, 62 Wis. 2d 295, 315, 215 N.W.2d 9, 20 (1974).
33. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 8, at 195 (quoting Judge Cooley).
34. W. PROSSER, supra note 11, § 117, at 804.
35. Id. at 804-14. This formulation has been repeatedly quoted by courts, and has
served as the conceptual foundation for a number of the leading cases. See, e.g., Zacchini
v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 571-73 & 574 n.ll (1977); Lugosi v.
Universal Pictures Co., 139 Cal. Rptr. 35, 38 (Ct. App. 1977). Moreover, Dean Prosser's
formulation is now ensconced in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1976). While
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While these are certainly comprehensible concepts, the scope of the
protection that they offer remains far from clear. Part of the confusion
results from the fact that the term "privacy" includes various injuries
unrelated to media portrayals. Intrusion, the first of Prosser's categories,
does not involve any form of publication, and thus has no particular
connection with the media.3 6 The three remaining types of injury
identified by Prosser, although commonly associated with media por-
trayals, may also arise in unrelated contexts; a private detective or
a doctor may reveal private facts, or present a person in a false light,3 7
and a person's name may be misappropriated by an impostor.38 More-
over, a number of commentators define "privacy" in more expansive
terms than Prosser does, linking it to autonomy, dignity, or other soar-
ing conceptions that reach far beyond both the issue of media portrayals
and the general law of torts.39
There is no reason, of course, why any general formulation of the
right of privacy must focus on the issue of media portrayals. But the
context of these portrayals differs sharply from other contexts in which
a privacy right may be invoked. No particular public policy favors the
intruder, the impostor, 40 or the government bureaucrat who reveals
confidential information. 41 In contrast, the media are generally pro-
Warren and Brandeis created the idea of a right of privacy, Prosser was the major in-
fluence on its current formulation. See Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity:
An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 962, 963-64 (1964).
36. See, e.g., Rugg v. McCarty, 173 Colo. 170, 173-76, 476 P.2d 753, 754-56 (1970) (op-
pressive debt collection efforts constitute invasion of privacy); Estate of Berthiaume v.
Pratt, 365 A.2d 792, 794-97 (Me. 1976) (photograph of dying person for use in medical
records constitutes invasion of privacy). It is possible, of course, for media reporters to be
guilty of this sort of intrusion. See, e.g., Green Valley School, Inc. v. Cowles Fla. Broad-
casting, Inc., 327 So. 2d 810 (Fla. App. 1976) (participation of reporters in police search
of private school); Le Mistral, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 61 A.D.2d 491,
402 N.Y.S.2d 815 (1978) (unauthorized entry of television camera crew into private
restaurant). But such intrusions are independent of the reporters' right to publish the
material they have acquired. See, e.g., id. at 494, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 817.
37. See, e.g., Home v. Patton, 291 Ala. 701, 287 So. 2d 824 (1973) (disclosure of private
facts in medical records by doctor); Devlin v. Greiner, 147 N.J. Super. 446, 371 A.2d 380
(Super. Ct. Law Div. 1977) (false report by private investigator in divorce proceedings
regarding wife's amorous activities).
38. See, e.g., Schlessman v. Schlessman, 50 Ohio App. 2d 179, 361 N.E.2d 1347 (1975)
(forgery of daughter-in-law's name on tax return); Hinish v. Meier &- Frank Co., 166 Or.
482, 113 P.2d 438 (1941) (unauthorized use of name on telegram to governor).
39. See, e.g., Bloustein, supra note 35 (human dignity); Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12
HAry. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 233 (1977) (autonomy); cf. Note, Toward a Constitutional Theory
of Individuality: The Privacy Opinions of Justice Douglas, 87 YALE L.J. 1579 (1978)
(arguing that Justice Douglas developed unified idea of privacy based on principles of
individuality).
40. See notes 36 & 38 sup ra.
41. See Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973) (government officials liable for disclosure
of school records in congressional committee report); Menard v. Mitchell, 328 F. Supp. 718
(D.D.C. 1971), modified sub nora. Menard v. Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (govern-
ment officials liable for disclosure of arrest records).
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tected by one of our strongest public policies-the First Amendment's
guarantee of free speech. This policy, which will inevitably be in-
volved when protection against media portrayals is sought, necessarily
has a profound effect upon privacy suits involving such portrayals. 42
To some extent, the nature of this effect is similar to that in libel law.
In situations where a media portrayal was potentially actionable on
privacy grounds, the First Amendment has been applied to determine
what degree of fault will lead to liability.43 The impact of the First
Amendment on the right of privacy, however, goes well beyond the
imposition of a constitutional fault standard. It also goes beyond the
creation of specific privileges against privacy suits, which, like the fault
standard, seem to follow the pattern established in libel law.44 The
42. Attempts to link the tort law right of privacy to broader concepts, see note 39 subra,
create even greater confusion than the use of the term privacy to cover intrusion or im-
personation. While certain types of constitutional rights have also been labeled privacy,
see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (right to be free of government
regulation of personal decisionmaking); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949) (Fourth
Amendment right to be free of unreasonable search or seizure), the general approach has
been to treat the constitutional right of privacy as quite separate from its common law
namesake, e.g., Hill, supra note 23, at 1254 n.222 (1976); Note, An Accommodation of
Privacy Interests and First Amendment Rights in Public Disclosure Cases, 124 U. PA. L.
REv. 1385, 1409-10 (1976). A crucial distinction between the two types of rights is that the
common law right operates as a control on private behavior, while the constitutional right
operates as a control on government. The two rights are necessarily different because our
concept of appropriate behavior for private persons and government officials is different.
See, e.g., Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 513-21 (1976) (constitutionality of ban on picket-
ing depends on whether state action is present); Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents, 403 U.S.
388, 391-92 (1971) (it is not correct "to treat the relationship between a citizen and a
federal agent unconstitutionally exercising his authority as no different from the relation-
ship between two private citizens").
For one case decided on the theory that the common law and constitutional rights are
closely related, see Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 284 F. Supp. 925, 932 (C.D. Cal. 1968) (re-
porter's photograph of person in home violates both common law and constitutional right
of privacy). Dietemann, however, appears to be an isolated and not particularly con-
vincing example. See Morris v. Danna, 411 F. Supp. 1300, 1303-05 (D. Minn. 1976), a'd,
547 F.2d 436 (8th Cir. 1977) (privacy tort claim does not state cause of action under
Constitution).
43. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 387-88 (1967) (applying prevailing con-
stitutional fault standard for libel to action under New York privacy statute). Under this
approach, it may be that the defamation law distinction in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
418 U.S. 323 (1974), would be applied to privacy actions, so that public figures would be
required to prove actual malice, while private figures could recover for negligent violations.
See Rinsley v. Brandt, 446 F. Supp. 850 (D. Kan. 1977) (applying Gertz public-private
distinction to privacy action); Hill, supra note 23. at 1274 & n.321. The Supreme Court,
however, has not addressed the issue of fault standard for privacy actions since it changed
the standard for defamation actions in Gertz.
44. W. PROssER, supra note 11, § 118. See, e.g., Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420
U.S. 469 (1975) (accurate publication of material obtained from official court records
immune from privacy suit); cf. Sciandra v. Lynett, 409 Pa. 595, 187 A.2d 586 (1963) (in
absence of intentional injury, reports of official documents are immune from defamation
actions); RESTATEtENT Or ToRTs § 611 (1938) (same). But see Hill, supra note 23, at 1264-68
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First Amendment's impact on privacy, in fact, goes to the very con-
ception of the right itself. Although constitutional decisions have left
the definition of libel relatively unchanged, 45 the basic scope of privacy
rights has been determined largely on the basis of First Amendment
considerations. Nondefamatory portrayals are protected from liability
if they are deemed newsworthy or in the public interest, if they are
partially informative, or if they possess artistic merit. Thus publication
of facts relating to the birth of a child to a twelve year old girl,46 the
contents of memoranda stolen from a legislator's files,4 7 and an in-
nocent person's presence at the scene of a crime4s have been held to be
immune from privacy actions under a newsworthiness standard. Simi-
larly, fictionalized accounts of the lives of well-known people, including
accounts that depict entirely imaginary events, have been protected on
the theory that they could inform or entertain the public. 49 As a result,
the First Amendment is the predominant factor in determining the
scope of an individual's right to sue the media for portrayals that im-
pinge upon his privacy.
The right of privacy, however, has not developed as a residual
category or as a coordinate aspect of constitutional adjudication. Al-
though the leading commentators, including Warren and Brandeis, have
recognized that the right of privacy could conflict with First Amend-
ment values,50 they have proceeded to define this right as an inde-
pendent legal concept, with its own policy justifications.51 Con-
(arguing that protection granted by Court in Cox exceeds common law protection). If
Professor Hill is correct, then the impact of the First Amendment on privacy actions is
greater still in that it tends to create privileges that go beyond their defamation law
analogues.
45. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974) (First Amendment does
not prohibit states from providing remedies for types of speech regarded as defamatory at
common law); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (dictum) (same); cf.
note 139 infra (citing cases holding remedy for libel consistent with First Amendment).
46. Meetze v. Associated Press, 230 S.C. 330, 95 S.E.2d 606 (1956).
47. Pearson v. Dodd, 410 F.2d 701 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 947 (1969).
48. Jacova v. Southern Radio 9- Television Co., 83 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 1955).
49. E.g., Hicks v. Casablanca Records & Filmworks, 464 F. Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)
(largely fictionalized account of incident in Agatha Christie's life); Leopold v. Levin, 45
Il. 2d 434, 259 N.E.2d 250 (1970) (fictionalized account based on lives of Leopold and
Loeb, including entirely imaginary incident).
50. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 8, at 214 (right of privacy cannot "prohibit any
publication of matter which is of public or general interest"). See W. PROSSER, supra note
11, at § 118 (discussion of constitutional privilege). Professor Kalven suggested that the
First Amendment privilege might vitiate the right of privacy in its entirety. Kalven,
Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 326,
355-37 (1966). But neither Kalven, nor Warren and Brandeis, nor the other commentators
have attempted to develop a single framework that would incorporate both First Amend-
ment and privacy considerations.
51. See, e.g., REsrATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1976) ("One who invades the right
of privacy of another is subject to liability for the resulting harm to the interests of the
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sequently, their definitions give no clue why the right of privacy
lapses when a public figure or a newsworthy event is involved. There
is no inherent reason why someone whose parents were involved in a
highly publicized trial does not have a "right to be let alone,"5 2 or why
someone whose personal habits are reported in the media has no cause
of action when those habits are sufficiently bizarre that they are of
general public interest.5 This makes all these definitions somewhat
problematic, since they define the right in terms of its maximum
possible extent, without reference to the limitations derived from pre-
dominant principles of constitutional law.
The problem that arises when the right of privacy is initially de-
fined without reference to constitutional law is that it then becomes
necessary to resolve inevitable conflicts between the two. Specifically,
it becomes necessary to explain why the right of privacy applies in cer-
tain situations, but must yield to the First Amendment in others. One
common explanation is based on the idea of waiver; a public figure is
viewed as having waived his right of privacy by virtue of his statusY4
other."); Warren & Brandeis, supra note 8, at 195-96 ("Recent inventions and business
methods call attention to the next step which must be taken for the protection of the
person. . . . [T]he question [is] whether our law will recognize and protect the right to
privacy....") In his treatise, Dean Prosser devotes one chapter to defining the right of
privacy, and then discusses constitutional privilege to avoid liability in a separate chapter.
W. PROSSER, supra note 11, §§ 117 (right of privacy), 118 (constitutional privilege).
52. See Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1066 (2d Cir. 1977) ("In the course of exten-
sive public debate revolving about the Rosenberg trial appellants were cast into the lime-
light and became 'public figures'...."); cf. Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F.2d 806
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 711 (1940) (child prodigy remains public figure as adult).
53. See Virgil v. Sports Illustrated, 424 F. Supp. 1286 (S.D. Cal. 1976) (habits included
diving off stairs, extinguishing cigarettes in mouth, eating spiders; privacy suit dismissed
on summary judgment).
54. See, e.g., Chaplin v. National Broadcasting Co., 15 F.R.D. 134, 139 (S.D.N.Y. 1953)
(privilege against common law right of privacy generally recognized either on ground of
public interest or "under a doctrine of waiver by prominent public figures or those in-
volved in events of public interest"); Cohen v. Marx, 94 Cal. App. 2d 704, 705, 211 P.2d
320, 321 (1949) (public person "relinquishes a part of his right of privacy"). Reliance on
this waiver rationale is apparent in recent Supreme Court cases holding that particular
people are not public figures. In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974), the
Court described the plaintiff as having "relinquished no part of his interest in the protec-
tion of his own good name." In Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976), the plaintiff's
decision to initiate a divorce action that ultimately became highly publicized was held
not to make her a public figure, since that was the only way for her to vindicate her
rights. Id. at 454, 457. Similarly, in Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 47 U.S.L.W. 4840
(U.S. June 26, 1979), the Court indicated that plaintiff's failure to answer a subpoena had
not made him a public figure since he was motivated by illness, rather than by any desire
to make a political statement. Id. at 4842-43. There is a suggestion in these decisions that
becoming a public figure is a conscious, almost culpable, choice.
Of course, a genuine waiver or relinquishment of privacy-based rights can occur. See,
e.g., Johnson v. Boeing Airplane Co., 175 Kan. 275, 282-83, 262 P.2d 808, 813-14 (1953) (con-
sent to be photographed represents relinquishment of privacy rights). But an explicit
waiver of this kind is much more similar to a contractual grant, see, e.g., Wrangell v. C.F.
Hathaway Co., 22 A.D.2d 649, 253 N.Y.S.2d 41 (1964) ("Man in Hathaway Shirt" cannot ob-
ject on privacy grounds when picture used to sell women's blouses, but may have breach of
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Clearly, however, this explanation is not meant to be taken literally.
A waiver is generally defined as "an intentional relinquishment or
abandonment of a known right or privilege," 55 and it seems rather
fanciful to suggest that someone has voluntarily agreed to publicity
about his private life when he accepts a part in a motion picture,5 6 or
graduates from college at the age of sixteen, 7 or speaks out on a subject
of public concern.58 The concept of waiver involved in these cases is
that of a constructive waiver-in other words, it is merely a way of
restating the conclusion that public figures have no right of privacy
due to the countervailing and more powerful commands of the First
Amendment.
Another method of resolving the conflict between the First Amend-
ment and the right of privacy is to employ the balancing test that is
familiar from so many other areas of constitutional adjudication. Using
this test, courts weigh the competing values of publication and
privacy; where the publication is speech protected by the First Amend-
ment, it is deemed to outweigh the rights of the individual portrayed.5 9
Balancing may sometimes be a useful analytic tool, but only when the
factors that are being balanced are genuinely comparable. This gen-
erally requires an analysis cast in terms of the underlying social policy
justifications of the competing rights. If such an analysis is to be done
with the First Amendment and the right of privacy, however, it would
appear to be more confusing than clarifying to define the right of
contract claim), than to the kinds of waivers used in the public figure cases. Explicit
waivers are real agreements representing the actual intentions of the parties; constructive
waivers are merely imaginary legal superstructures, employed to justify conclusions reached
on other grounds.
55. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
56. See Paramount Pictures, Inc. v. Leader Press, Inc., 24 F. Supp. 1004 (W.D. Okla.
1938), rev'd on other grounds, 106 F.2d 229 (10th Cir. 1939).
57. See Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 711
(1940).
58. E.g., Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 140-41, 155 (1967) (plurality
opinion) (person who spoke to crowd during riot is public figure); cf. Meeropol v. Nizer,
560 F.2d 1061, 1066 (2d Cir. 1977) (children of Rosenbergs public figures because they
were cast into public debate about parents' trial). The individuals in these cases may
have voluntarily performed certain acts, but they did not voluntarily agree to publicity of
any kind. The volition required for a genuine waiver is much more closely linked to a
conscious relinquishment of one's rights than the volition involved in these cases. While
the Supreme Court's two most recent decisions regarding public and private figures,
Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 47 U.S.L.W. 4827 (U.S. June 26, 1979); Wolston v. Reader's Digest
Ass'n, 47 U.S.L.W. 4840 (U.S. June 26, 1979), may be viewed as reducing the likelihood that
one may become a public figure by a purely involuntary act, they do not solve this basic
problem with the waiver argument.
59. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 343 (1974) (balancing test applied in
libel context); Sidis v. F-R Publishing Co., 113 F.2d 806, 808-10 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311
U.S. 711 (1940) (balancing test applied in privacy context). See generally Brosnahan, From
Times v. Sullivan to Gertz v. Welch: Ten Years of Balancing Libel Law and The First
Amendment, 26 HAsrINGs L.J. 777 (1975).
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privacy in advance, and in isolation from the First Amendment, and
then balance one against the other as separate rights. Moreover, such
balancing implies that rights of equal value are involved, when in
reality the First Amendment necessarily takes precedence over any
competing, non-constitutional policy.
C. The Right of Publicity
Despite the expansive form in which it has been cast, the right of
privacy has not proved adequate to cover all the nondefamatory por-
trayals that injure identifiable personal interests; portrayals that cause
economic injury to well-known people, for example, do not rest securely
within the right of privacy. Although such portrayals could conceivably
be considered a part of Prosser's fourth category, misappropriation,
courts traditionally have exhibited a certain hostility to claims for relief
against media portrayals that contain no invasions of the person's pri-
vate life,60 and the few older cases in which relief was granted were
based on breach of contract. 61 Indeed the very word "privacy" sounds
contradictory when applied to claims of this nature. Many of the
individuals involved are professional performers of one sort or another,
such as actors or athletes; their complaint is not that they have received
publicity, but that they have failed to receive its benefits.602 As several
60. See, e.g., O'Brien v. Pabst Sales Co., 124 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 315
U.S. 823 (1942) (college football player has no cause of action when photograph is used on
schedules published by beer company); Gautier v. Pro-Football, Inc., 304 N.Y. 354, 107
N.E.2d 485 (1952) (performer has no cause of action for breach of privacy when his
trained animal act performed during football game is telecast). Relief was sometimes
granted to well-known people for unauthorized use of their names. See von Thodorovich
v. Franz Josef Beneficial Ass'n, 154 F. 911 (E.D. Pa. 1907); Edison v. Edison Polyform &
Mfg. Co., 73 N.J. Eq. 136, 67 A. 392 (1907). But the basis of this relief was generally
that the person involved, well-known though he might be, had not sought publicity, or
at least had not sought publicity of the kind he received, and thus had suffered a viola-
tion of his desire for privacy.
61. E.g., Lunceford v. Wilcox, 88 N.Y.S.2d 225 (N.Y. City Ct. 1949) (contract with
Jimmie Lunceford's widow'for use of name in continuing "Jimmie Lunceford's Orchestra"
enforced); cf. Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 222 N.Y. 88, 118 N.E. 214 (1917) (con-
tract for exclusive use of name enforced). Several other early cases were based on the
related idea of unfair competition. See, e.g., Pittsburgh Athletic Co. v. KQV Broadcasting
Co., 24 F. Supp. 490 (W.D. Pa. 1938) (unauthorized play-by-play broadcast of baseball
game); Chaplin v. Amador, 93 Cal. App. 358, 269 P. 544 (Ct. App. 1928) (imitation of
Charlie Chaplin's name, clothing and behavior). In these cases, the performer or broad-
caster was considered to have a property right with which it was unfair to interfere. The
difficulty with this rationale was that it focused on the well-established aspect of this
type of suit, that a person's property could not be expropriated by another, to the ex-
clusion of the more difficult question of how the property was created.
62. See, e.g., Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting Corp., 229 F.2d 481, 487 (-3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 926 (1956) (unauthorized use of film of boxer for television
broadcast); Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.),




courts have noted, publicity, far from being unwelcome to such people,
is their very livelihood. 63 To describe this right to profit from one's
general notoriety as a right of privacy was naturally perceived as a
misuse of language and law.
In order to resolve some of the anomalies involving the right to
profit from one's name or likeness, a number of courts and com-
mentators have separated this right from the right of privacy and
identified it as an independent concept termed the "right of publicity."
Direct recognition of the right of publicity first came in Haelan
Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.,64 a 1953 case that
raised the question of whether an exclusive contract right to photo-
graph a person was legally cognizable. The court, through Judge
Jerome Frank, held that it was: "We think that, in addition to and
independent of [the] right of privacy . . . a man has a right in the
publicity value of his photograph, i.e., the right to grant the exclusive
privilege of publishing his picture .... ,,6 This conclusion was soon
seconded in a leading article by Professor Nimmer.06 During the years
that followed, the right of publicity gradually gained acceptance; by
the 1970s, judicial recognition had been granted in a substantial num-
ber of jurisdictions0 7
The right of publicity has been defined with surprising consistency
by courts and commentators; it is generally conceived as comprising a
person's right in the use of his name, likeness, activities, or personal
characteristics.0 6 This amicable unanimity in defining the right is some-
what illusory, however, for there is considerable disagreement about
63. See, e.g., Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953); Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277,
1282 (D. Minn. 1970); Hogan v. A.S. Barnes & Co., 114 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 314, 316 (Pa. Ct.
C.P. Phila. County 1957).
64. 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953).
65. Id. at 868.
66. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 203 (1954).
67. The right of publicity has been explicitly recognized in many of the leading com-
mercial jurisdictions. See, e.g., Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting Corp., 229 F.2d 481
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 926 (1956) (Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Delaware, New
York); Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953) (New York); Lugosi v. Universal Pictures Co., 139 Cal.
Rptr. 35 (Ct. App. 1977) (California); Canessa v. J. I. Kislak, Inc., 97 N.J. Super. 327, 351-
52, 235 A.2d 62, 76 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1967) (New Jersey); Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard
Broadcasting Co., 47 Ohio St. 2d 224, 231-34, 351 N.E.2d 454, 458-60 (1976), rev.'d on other
grounds, 433 U.S. 562 (1977) (Ohio).
68. E.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 569 (1977) (right
of publicity is performer's "'personal control over commercial display and exploitation of
his personality and the exercise of his talents'") (quoting decision below, 47 Ohio St. 2d
224, 231, 351 N.E.2d 454, 459 (1976)) (footnote omitted); Cepeda v. Swift & Co., 415 F.2d
1205, 1206 (8th Cir. 1969) (ballplayer "has a valuable property right in his name, photo-
graph and image and .. . he may sell these property rights").
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what the definition means. To begin with, there is no consistent test
for determining how far the right of publicity extends. The language
of some courts would suggest that virtually any recognizable attribute
would be protected. 9 But a number of other decisions have refused
to extend the right of publicity nearly as far.70 As a result, the extent to
which a person's attributes are protected by the right of publicity re-
mains unclear.
This lack of clarity is closely linked to a deeper conceptual problem.
The First Amendment inevitably defines the operation and extent of
the right of publicity; once the defendant can establish that the ex-
pression in question is protected, he will almost invariably prevail.71
But the right of publicity, like the right of privacy, has been defined
as if it existed in isolation from the First Amendment. In Zacchini v.
Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.,72 the Supreme Court suggested that
the right of publicity is less limited by First Amendment principles,
since it does not withhold the material in question from the public,
but only determines who will benefit from its dissemination. Even
assuming that this argument is correct,73 it only alters the scope of
constitutional protection, without clarifying the relationship between
69. See, e.g., Motschenbacher v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir.
1974) (distinctive racing car); Lahr v. Adell Chem. Co., 300 F.2d 256 (Ist Cir. 1962) (dis-
tinctive speaking style); Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (general
physical impression); Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277 (D. Minn. 1970) (playing
statistics); Lugosi v. Universal Pictures Co., 172 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 541 (Super Ct. L.A.
County 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 139 Cal. Rptr. 35 (Ct. App. 1977) (likeness and char-
acterization).
70. E.g., Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 402 U.S. 906 (1971) (no relief for imitation of singing style); National Football
League v. Governor of Del., 435 F. Supp. 1372, 1377-78 (D. Del. 1977) (no relief for use of
football scores); Booth v. Curtis Publishing Co., 11 N.Y.2d 907, 182 N.E.2d 812, 228
N.Y.S.2d 468 (1962) (no relief for use of photograph related to news story in advertisement
of magazine carrying story); Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 58 Misc.
2d 1, 294 N.Y.S.2d 122 (Sup. Ct. 1968), af'd meem., 32 A.D.2d 892, 301 N.Y.S.2d 948 (1969)
(no relief for use of facts about personal life).
71. Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 58 Misc. 2d 1, 6, 294 N.Y.S.2d
122, 129 (Sup. Ct. 1968), aff'd meem., 32 A.D.2d 892, 301 N.Y.S.2d 948 (1969) ("Just as a
public figure's 'right of privacy' must yield to the public interest so too must the 'right
of publicity' bow where such conflicts with the free dissemination of thoughts, ideas,
newsworthy events, and matters of public interest.") See Namath v. Sports Illustrated, 48
A.D.2d 487, 371 N.Y.S.2d 10 (1975) (photograph of celebrity used for advertising of
magazine where magazine carried news stories about person is protected by First Amend-
ment); Frosch v. Grossett & Dunlap, Inc., No. 01527/75 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 29, 1979)
(sensationalized biography, which plaintiff claimed was merchandise found to be protected
by First Amendment).
72. 433 U.S. 562, 578 (1977). See Note, The Right of Publicity-Protection for Public
Figures and Celebrities, 42 BROOKLYN L. REV. 527, 549-57 (1976); cf. Nimmer, Does Copy-
right Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press? 17 U.C.L.A.
L. REV. 1180 (1970) (copyright does not abridge First Amendment because does not restrain
expression of ideas).
73. But see pp. 1620-21 infra (arguing that there is no real distinction between restrict-
ing and controlling information).
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the First Amendment and the right of publicity. This is evident from
the Zacchini case itself, in which the Supreme Court had to decide
whether a telecast of a "human cannonball" act was protected against
any right of publicity claims. The Court's conclusion was that the tele-
cast had gone beyond the bounds of First Amendment protection by
appropriating Zacchini's "entire act."74 As Justice Powell's dissent sug-
gested, this is not a particularly clear standard, and it is unlikely to be
available in the majority of cases.70 More importantly, since the stan-
dard is ultimately based on First Amendment considerations, it still
remains necessary to consider the constitutional issue when defining
the extent of publicity rights.
So long as the relationship between the right of publicity and the
First Amendment is not confronted directly, inconsistent holdings are
virtually inevitable. For example, a commercially distributed poster of
Pat Paulsen, during his facetious campaign for the presidency, was held
to be protected speech,70 but a poster of Elvis Presley, announcing his
death, was held to be unprotected, and thus subject to another's right
of publicity.77 In order for these two cases to be reconciled, the tension
between publicity rights and free speech must be addressed directly.
As with privacy, it seems counterproductive to develop a definition
of a legal remedy against media portrayals that fails to incorporate the
commands of the First Amendment.78
74. 433 U.S. at 575.
75. Id. at 579 & n.1 (Powell, J., dissenting).
76. Paulsen v. Personality Posters, Inc., 59 Misc. 2d 444, 299 N.Y.S.2d 501 (Sup. Ct.
1968).
77. Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S.
Ct. 1215 (1979).
78. Further confusion has been engendered by the relationship that the right of
publicity bears to Dean Prosser's category of appropriation of one's name or likeness for
commercial purposes. It is precisely such misappropriations that first gave rise to the idea
of a right of publicity. See Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting Corp., 229 F.2d 481
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 926 (1956); Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing
Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953). But this right covers
only some kinds of commercial appropriations. Because the right of publicity rests on the
idea of damage to property of demonstrated economic worth, it does not extend to the
misappropriation of a person's name or likeness when that person has not previously ex-
ploited these attributes in some commercial manner. Misappropriations of this kind, which
were the issue in many of the most venerable privacy cases, e.g., Pavesich v. New England
Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905) (unauthorized use of likeness and testimonial
in advertisement); Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442
(1902) (unauthorized use of likeness in advertisement), remain privacy cases still, e.g., Olan
Mills, Inc. v. Dodd, 234 Ark. 495, 353 S.V.2d 22 (1962) (use of photograph to advertise
sample of defendant's photography work); Flores v. Mosler Safe Co., 7 N.Y.2d 276, 164
N.E.2d 853, 196 N.Y.S.2d 975 (1959) (reprinting news item containing person's name and
photograph in advertisement). This partial overlap between the right of publicity and
the privacy tort of misappropriation increases the uncertainty surrounding the right of
publicity.
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D. The Problems with the Existing Approaches
Because the rights of privacy and publicity, together with the law
of libel, have been defined in isolation from the First Amendment,
these rights provide incomplete and unsatisfactory rationales for the
resolution of cases involving media portrayals. To be sure, the result
could have been considerably more unfortunate. Privacy and publicity
could have become judicial devices to obscure and attenuate the
media's First Amendment protection. In fact, most courts have man-
aged to incorporate First Amendment concerns into their decisions,
albeit with a certain grinding of conceptual gears. But the absence of
any explicitly stated general principles combining the media's right to
portray real people with the individual's right to avoid such portrayals
has led to a number of difficulties.
One such difficulty is that some courts have been led astray in their
efforts to apply the existing rationales and have consequently reached
unsupportable conclusions. A notable example was Commonwealth v.
Wiseman.79 In a film entitled Titicut Follies, Wiseman documented
the squalid conditions at a state hospital for the criminally insane,
focusing on the naked and neglected state in which the inmates were
kept. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts enjoined general
exhibition of the film on the grounds that it invaded the privacy rights
of the inmates.80 There is, however, a crucial difference between
photographing a person who is naked and documenting the fact that
the person is being kept in a state of nakedness and neglect, particularly
when his keeper is the state. Because the court relied on the general
idea of privacy, it failed to perceive this difference; consequently it con-
fused voyeurism with social commentary.81 A clearer focus on the First
Amendment issues involved would have avoided this confusion.
82
79. 356 Mass. 251, 249 N.E.2d 610 (1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 960 (1970).
80. Id. at 258-61, 249 N.E.2d at 615-17. In addition, the court held that Wiseman had
exceeded the scope of permission granted him to make the film by the administrator of
the facility. Id. at 261, 249 N.E.2d at 617. This was treated as an alternative ground for
the decision at some points, and a contributing factor at others, see id. at 258-61, 249
N.E.2d at 615-17.
81. The court raised the issue that Wiseman's film might be protected under the First
Amendment as a matter of valid public interest, but rejected it after balancing the free
speech interest against the privacy rights of the inmates. Id. at 261, 249 N.E.2d at 617.
This conclusion fails to give adequate weights to the free speech interest. The alternative
ground for the holding, that Wiseman had exceeded the scope of permission, see id., also
ignores the importance of free speech, because it fails to consider whether Wiseman's
activities were protected by the First Amendment. Instead, the court relied on the gen-
eral notion of privacy to establish that the administrator's efforts to limit filming by
Wiseman were valid.
82. Cf. Cason v. Baskin, 155 Fla. 198, 20 So. 2d 243 (1944), afl'd, 159 Fla. 31, 90 So. 2d
635 (1947) (nominal damages awarded for description of woman's unattractive characteristics
in autobiography); Polakoff v. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 3 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA)
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The most complex and controversial example of the confusion
resulting from the present state of the law involves the extent to which
the right of publicity is devisable. The right of privacy was tradition-
ally regarded as a personal right, which inhered in the individual during
his lifetime and vanished with him at his death . 3 When the right of
publicity was separated from the right of privacy, its independent
existence was justified by characterizing it as a property right.8 4 This
characterization seemed a natural one when the right was first articu-
lated, since the early cases involved a person's ability to make a profit
from his name, likeness, or other attributes, and since the most common
way to do so is to sell exclusive rights to use these characteristics.
Designation of a publicity right as property could have several rather
wide-ranging implications, however. It could imply that the right, like
other property rights, is not only transferable, but that it is taxable;
that it can serve as a capital asset, or as security for a loan; and that it
should be taken into account in a divorce settlement. But the most
important of all is the implication that the right of publicity is devis-
able and can thus be asserted by the heirs of a celebrity. When first
presented with this theory, courts found it sufficiently disconcerting
to reject it outright.85 However, after two decades of agreement that
the right of publicity is a property right, the idea became more
palatable, and several courts held that the right could be inherited.8 6
2516 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978) (potential privacy claim recognized for fictionalized but non-
defamatory account of Lucky Luciano's lawyer). In Cason, the behavior portrayed was in
no sense private; it was the person's general demeanor, observable by anyone in the
author's community. In Polakoff, nothing was revealed, and no serious distortions oc-
curred. The author simply added dramatic incidents to the plaintiff's admitted relation-
ship with Luciano, an approach that seems well within the bounds of dramatic license. As
in Wiseman, the privacy analysis in these cases obscured the First Amendment protection
that ordinarily attaches to autobiography and fictionalized history.
83. See Maritote v. Desilu Productions, Inc., 345 F.2d 418 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 883 (1965); Frosch v. Grossett & Dunlap, Inc., No. 01527/75 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 30,
1979); W. PROSSER, suPra note 11, § 117, at 814-15.
84. In Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953), the characterization of the right of publicity as a property
right was regarded as an arbitrary exercise in classification. Judge Frank wrote that
whether the right is "labelled a 'property' right is immaterial; for here, as often else-
where, the tag 'property' simply symbolizes the fact that courts enforce a claim which
has pecuniary worth." Id. at 868. But other courts have flatly stated that a property right
is involved. E.g., Cepeda v. Swift & Co., 415 F.2d 1205, 1206 (8th Cir. 1969); Uhlaender v.
Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277 (D. Minn. 1970); see Gordon, Right of Property in Name,
Likeness and Personal History, 55 Nw. U.L. REv. 553 (1960).
85. E.g., James v. Screen Gems, Inc., 174 Cal. App. 2d 650, 653-54, 344 P.2d 799, 801
(1959); Schumann v. Loew's, Inc., 144 N.Y.S.2d 27, 30 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
86. Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836, 844 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) ("There ap-
pears to be no logical reason to terminate this right [of publicity] upon death of the person
protected. It is for this reason, presumably, that this publicity right has been deemed a
'property right.' ") (footnote omitted); Lugosi v. Universal Pictures Co., 172 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
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One of these cases has since been reversed;8 7 other cases have proposed
different rationales and came to different conclusions about the cir-
cumstances under which inheritance may occur. 8 The devisability of
the right of publicity, therefore, remains a subject of disagreement
among courts, and the basis on which the issue is to be resolved remains
unclear.
The existing approaches regarding privacy and publicity rights have
produced a problem that is far more serious than wrongly decided or
conflicting cases, however. This problem is the general uncertainty
about the way in which the relevant principles are to be applied. Those
involved in creating media productions that employ portrayals will
naturally want to know the limits of potential liability. But if one uses
the concepts of privacy and publicity rights as analytic tools, it is simply
impossible to predict with any certainty how a court will decide a
particular case. Many difficult but common situations, such as fic-
tionalized accounts of people's lives or commercial products that use
a person's attributes, cannot be assessed solely in terms of privacy
or publicity. As a result, the courts are forced to rely on a variety of
other criteria such as public interest, newsworthiness, entertainment
value, and commercialism. The existing rationales of privacy and
publicity fail to provide an explanation for use of these criteria; con-
sequently, those rationales cannot account for the prevailing pattern of
court decisions.
Unpredictability is less than ideal in any area of law, but it has al-
ways been regarded as particularly undesirable when issues of free
speech are concerned. It is generally held that First Amendment rights
require "breathing space," and uncertainty about the legal standards
that control these rights is regarded as having a "chilling effect" on
freedom of expression."" This doctrine is based on the notion that
541, 551 (Super. Ct. L.A. County 1972), rev'd, 19 Cal. Rptr. 35 (Ct. App. 1977) ("Bela
Lugosi's interest or right in his likeness and appearance as Count Dracula was a property
right of such character and substance that it did not terminate with his death but
descended to his heirs.") See Note, supra note 72, at 541-49; Comment, Transfer of the
Right of Publicity: Dracula's Progeny and Privacy's Stepchild, 22 U.C.L.A. L. Rav. 1103
(1975).
87. Lugosi v. Universal Pictures Co., 139 Cal. Rptr. 35 (Ct. App. 1977).
88. E.g., Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99
S. Ct. 1215 (1979) (right to exploit name and likeness devisable if exercised and translated
into contractual right during person's life); Hicks v. Casablanca Records & Filmworks, 464
F. Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (right devisable if exploited during life). See pp. 1618-20 infra.
89. See, e.g., Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972) (vague statute forbidding abusive
language); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965) (overbroad statute forbidding sub-
versive activities and propaganda). The term "breathing space," in its constitutional
sense, was first employed in NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963) (Brennan, J.); the
1594
Vol. 88: 1577, 1979
Media Portrayals
First Amendment freedoms "are delicate and vulnerable, as well as
supremely precious in our society. The threat of sanctions may deter
their exercise almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions." 90
The chilling effect of unpredictable standards upon portrayals of
real people by the media is not merely a metaphor, but a very real
threat. Many portrayals are a part of elaborately produced motion
pictures, television dramas, or stage presentations, involving financiers,
distributors, exhibitors, and other diverse participants. Because a suc-
cessful suit can result in substantial damages, or even an injunction
against continued presentation of a production that may have cost mil-
lions of dollars,91 there is a natural unwillingness to assume these risks
in questionable cases. This will be particularly true if insurance against
these risks is unavailable because of the uncertainty of the prevailing
legal rules. As a result of this uncertainty, the public is likely to be
denied access to presentations that would otherwise have taken place,
and the goals of the First Amendment will have been frustrated.
II. New Principles for the Prevailing Pattern of Court Decisions
Despite the finality with which they are often invoked, the right of
privacy, the right of publicity, and even so well established an idea as
libel are not self-explanatory legal principles, but merely ways of stat-
ing legal conclusions. They represent conceptualizations of sets of cir-
cumstances in which courts will grant relief to individuals portrayed
by the media. Whether these rights are useful conceptualizations de-
pends on whether they are based on coherent and persuasive legal
reasoning. The difficulty that courts have experienced in ascribing
precise meaning to the privacy and publicity rights and applying them
to the facts presented by the cases would suggest that they are not so
phrase chilling effect is derived from language in Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 195
(1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Invalidation of the statutes involved in these cases is
based on two closely related ideas: first, that a statute imposing limits on First Amend-
ment rights is invalid if it is overbroad, see Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth
Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REv. 844 (1970); and second, that such a statute is invalid if it is
overly vague, see Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U.
PA. L. REv. 67 (1960).
Although these doctrines have characteristically been applied to statutes, examination
of the rationales that underlie them indicates that they are equally applicable to com-
mon law decisions. And it has been clearly established that the common law can be as
repugnant to the First Amendment as a legislative enactment. See New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); cf. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) ("[W]hether
the law of the state shall be declared by its legislature in a statute or by its highest court
in a decision is not a matter of federal concern.")
90. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963).
91. See note 7 supra (citing cases).
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based. All the problems discussed in the preceding section-the failure
to account satisfactorily for basic First Amendment considerations, the
confusion of terms, and the uncertain extent of the protections af-
forded-reveal the tension between the legal rights that courts have
identified and the results that they have reached.
Rather than taking the rights of privacy and publicity as given, it
is preferable to return to the initial issue, the portrayal of real people
by the media, in order to consider the basic social policies that control
this area of law and the principles of decision that can be derived
from these policies. A careful reading of the existing cases suggests
that there are a number of social policies at work, of which the First
Amendment is the most important. In light of these policies, two
principles that courts actually use in reaching their decisions can be
discerned. The primary principle, derived directly from First Amend-
ment considerations, centers on the purpose of the portrayal: if it serves
an informative or cultural function, it will be immune from liability;
if it serves no such function but merely exploits the individual por-
trayed, immunity will not be granted. In the latter case, courts then
look to the second principle, which is based on the concept of identi-
fiable harm: if the portrayed individual can demonstrate some ob-
servable injury, of a generally accepted nature, courts will grant relief;
if no such harm is apparent, relief will be denied. These two prin-
ciples account for court decisions regarding media portrayals more
consistently than any rules that can be stated solely in terms of the
rights of privacy and publicity.
A. The Policy Basis of the Prevailing Pattern
The primary social policy that determines the legal protection af-
forded to media portrayals is based on the First Amendment guarantee
of free speech and press.92 Although various explanations for this policy
have been advanced, the prevailing view is that free speech serves
92. The failure of the right of privacy to incorporate First Amendment concerns ap-
pears to be a product of the era in which these rights were first articulated. Although
Warren and Brandeis were aware of the free speech issue, see note 50 supra, they were
writing some four decades before the first invalidations of laws on First Amendment
grounds, see, e.g., Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931), and three decades before a
consistent body of free speech dissents had been developed, see, e.g., Abrams v. United
States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). The few First Amendment chal-
lenges that came before the Supreme Court were rejected without apparent difficulty. See
Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43 (1897) (upholding ordinance requiring permit to speak
on Boston Common); In re Rapier, 143 U.S. 110 (1892) (upholding statute prohibiting
passage of lottery advertisements through mails). Cf. Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454
(1907) upholding contempt conviction for criticism of state supreme court). But cf. id. at
463 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (brief free speech discussion).
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socially useful functions. The most crucial and widely accepted of these
functions is maintaining the integrity of the political process that
constitutes our system of self-government. 93 Thus, any nondefamatory
speech that contributes to the public debate of political or social issues
will receive protection from the First Amendment. A second function
of free speech is to communicate and expand our cultural experience.
This leads to the protection of creative, imaginative, and even merely
whimsical forms of expression. The second function may not be as
uniformly accepted as the first, but most commentators include it
among the social purposes that the First Amendment serves, either by
viewing it as an independent function,94 or by adopting an expansive
notion of public debate and public issues.05
The effect of these First Amendment policies on the rules regarding
media portrayals can be traced in terms of the types of portrayals in-
volved. Media portrayals of real people can be characterized as having
one of three possible purposes-they may inform, they may entertain,
or they may be designed only to sell a product, and thus be essentially
commercial in nature. To be sure, these three purposes will often tend
to merge, so that they may be regarded as representing portions of a
continuum, rather than as discrete and mutually exclusive elements.
Nonetheless, recognition of these different purposes can serve as a use-
ful starting point for analysis.
Portrayals that are primarily informative are often designated news.
Typically, such portrayals are found in newspaper, magazine, and radio
or television reporting, but they may also be included in books,
scholarly articles, and television or motion picture documentaries.9
The distinguishing characteristic of such portrayals is that they attempt
to describe, interpret, or assess the real world. Because these informative
portrayals are viewed as essential to the process of public debate, they
are afforded the fullest First Amendment protection. Thus, when
93. See, e.g., Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940) (Murphy, J.) ("Freedom
of discussion, if it would fulfill its historic function in this nation, must embrace all
issues about which information is needed or appropriate to enable the members of society
to cope with the experiences of their period."); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375
(1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6-7
(1970); A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 1-27 (1948);
Bork, supra note 22, at 26.
94. See, e.g., T. EMERSON, supra note 93, at 6-7; Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Ex-
pression, I PHILOSOPHY & PUB. AFF. 204 (1972).
95. See, e.g., Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REv.
245, 257. For a general discussion of the varying approaches to First Amendment theory,
see Wellington, supra note 23.
96. E.g., Humiston v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 189 A.D. 467, 178 N.Y.S. 752 (1919)
(newsreels); Rosemount Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 58 Misc. 2d 1, 294
N.Y.S.2d 122 (Sup. Ct. 1968), aff'd inem., 32 A.D.2d 892, 301 N.Y.S.2d 948 (1969) (biography).
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courts can discern an informative value in the portrayal in question,
they are likely to render it virtually immune from liability.
A second category of portrayals consists of those works that are
primarily designed for artistic or entertainment purposes. Included
in this category are fictionalized history, stage, motion picture or
television simulations of real events, mimicry, parody, and purely fic-
tional works set against an historical background. Because the portrayal
of real people is involved, these works often will have some informa-
tional content; they are distinguished from the first category, however,
because they employ conscious departures from accurate reporting. The
First Amendment protection granted to such works may be based on
both their informative and cultural functions. To some extent, they
share with news the function of informing the public about real people
and events. Such works, however, also constitute an important part of
the intellectual and creative activity that our society values very highly.
To this genre, after all, history owes its origins,97 and literature owes
many of its finest masterpieces. The recent spate of motion picture and
television dramas based on real events indicates the continuing vitality
of fictionalizations. 98
The cultural function of this type of entertainment provides an
independent basis for First Amendment protection. 0 To the extent
that this function is not as highly valued a basis for First Amendment
protection as the informative one, a lower level of protection for purely
entertainment oriented portrayals might be expected. This tendency
toward differential treatment is tempered, however, by the hesitation
of courts to make fine distinctions in cases in which free speech issues
are involved. As the Supreme Court has observed, "[t]he line between
the informing and the entertaining is too elusive for the protection of
[the First Amendment]."' 100 Consequently, any difference in the pro-
tection afforded news and entertainment portrayals is likely to be a
question of subtle shadings rather than explicitly different standards.
97. Ancient historians made extensive use of imaginary dramatization, particularly in
reporting speeches. See S. USHER, THE HISTORIANS OF GREECE AND ROME (1969).
98. See, e.g., Wojtowicz v. Delacorte Press, 43 N.Y.2d 858, 374 N.E.2d 129, 403 N.Y.S.2d
218 (1978) (involving book and motion picture Dog Day Afternoon, fictionalized accounts
of Brooklyn bank robbery); Cohn v. NBC, 3 MEDIA L. REP. 1999 (BNA) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978),
modified, 67 A.D.2d 140, 414 N.Y.S.2d 906 (1979) (involving Tail Gunner Joe, fictionalized
television account of McCarthy period); Rintels, In Defense of the Television 'Docu-
Drama,' N.Y. Times, Apr. 22, 1979, § 2, at 1; Silver, supra note 18.
99. See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 578 (1977)
("There is no doubt that entertainment, as well as news, enjoys First Amendment pro-
tection."); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952) ("The importance of
motion pictures as an organ of public opinion is not lessened by the fact that they are
designed to entertain as well as to inform.")
100. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948).
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The final category of media portrayals consists of those that neither
inform nor entertain, but merely sell a specific product. These por-
trayals may be part of advertising campaigns that attempt to establish
the quality or glamour of their product by invoking a well-known
figure. Alternatively, the portrayal itself may be the product, as is the
case with posters and other memorabilia. To be sure, the media, op-
erated largely by private corporations, are generally interested in selling
products. But when these products serve informative or cultural func-
tions, they are accorded a social value that transcends commercial
enterprise. If no such functions are present in a commercial product, a
portrayal will be granted little First Amendment protection.' 0 ' While
there is a social policy encouraging commercial enterprise and the free
use of public information for commercial gain, 102 it is not regarded as
being of constitutional proportions.
Thus the primary social policy in the area of media portrayals is one
that limits the right of the individual portrayed to obtain relief. There
are several countervailing policies, however, that support suits against
the media by individuals who are portrayed. The most important of
these policies, and the one that led directly to the initial conception
of privacy rights, is the protection of the freedom of the individual.
0 3
Public disclosure of personal information often constitutes an enormous
constraint on a person's activities. Certain disclosures can lead to
the kind of social stigma that has been recognized in constitutional law
101. Compare Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215, 222 (2d Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 99 S. Ct. 1215 (1979) (rejecting claim of First Amendment privilege for use of
photograph on poster of Elvis Presley) with Murray v. New York Magazine Co., 27 N.Y.2d
406, 267 N.E.2d 256, 318 N.Y.S.2d 474 (1971) (accepting claim of First Amendment
privilege for use of non-celebrity's picture on magazine cover because photograph was
related to news story); compare Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Urban Sys., Inc., 72 Misc. 2d
788, 790, 340 N.Y.S.2d 144, 146 (Sup. Ct.), modified, 42 A.D.2d 544, 345 N.Y.S.2d 17 (1973)
(holding producers of board game based on life of Howard Hughes liable because, "[i]n
reality, defendants are not disseminating news. They are not educating the public as to
the achievements of Howard Hughes. They are selling a commodity, a commercial
product .. "); with Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 58 Misc. 2d 1,
6, 294 N.Y.S.2d 122, 129 (Sup. Ct. 1968), aff'd mem., 32 A.D.2d 892, 301 N.Y.S.2d 948 (1969)
("The publication of a biography is clearly outside the ambit of the 'commercial use'
contemplated by the right of publicity and such right can have no application to the
publication of factual material which is constitutionally protected.")
While courts no longer refuse to protect speech because it is in a commercial context,
they tend to restrict protection to the communication of information. See, e.g., Bates v.
State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (advertising by lawyers); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (price advertising of drugs).
102. Cf. Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938) (permitting imitation
of unpatented product in interest of commerce and competition); Smith v. Chanel, Inc.,
402 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1968) (permitting use of trademark in comparative advertising in
interest of competition).
103. See generally A. Was'sN, PRIVACY AND FREaaOm (1970).
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as a direct infringement of a person's liberty.10 4 It is on this basis that
the disclosure of a person's past crimes can be actionable. 0 - In addition,
there are many activities in which people choose to engage, but that they
do not like to have generally publicized; various types of sexual be-
havior constitute the most obvious example.' 06 Thus disclosure of per-
sonal information can restrict a person's present activities by either
imposing the burden of past behavior or by raising the threat of future
revelation. Granting recovery for such disclosures is regarded by courts
as a means of discouraging these restrictions and thus advancing the
policy of individual freedom.
A second policy motivating courts to grant recovery for media
portrayals is the desire to prevent fraudulent business practices. 07
Media portrayals that represent such practices are generally unauthor-
ized endorsements-advertisements that use a person's photograph or
testimonial without his consent to recommend a product. 08 Such a
portrayal victimizes the individual by creating the false impression of
a particular business relationship between him and the advertiser.100 It
also victimizes the consuming public, because an unauthorized en-
dorsement is essentially a false claim about the product. Thus the
104. Compare Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971) (sheriff's posting of
person's picture as excessive drinker violates constitutionally protected liberty interest)
with Itzkovitch v. Whitaker, 115 La. 479, 39 So. 499 (1905) (circulation of innocent
person's photograph by private parties as part of local "Rogue's Gallery" violates right of
privacy). But cf. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976). Although the Paul opinion asserted
that it did not overrule Constantineau, it refused to find that circulation of a list of
suspected shoplifters by the police violated protected liberty interests. However, the court
specifically indicated that protection of such interests was the province of tort law. Id. at
697.
105. See, e.g., Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 4 Cal. 3d 529, 483 P.2d 34, 93 Cal. Rptr.
866 (1971); Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91 (Ct. App. 1931).
106. See, e.g., Garner v. Triangle Publications, 97 F. Supp. 546 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); Sutton
v. Hearst Corp., 277 A.D. 155, 98 N.Y.S.2d 233 (1950).
107. For statutory manifestations of this policy, see Federal Trade Commission Act, 15
U.S.C. § 45 (1976) (forbidding deceptive practices and unfair competition); Securities Act
of 1933, id. §§ 77a-77aa; Truth in Lending Act, id. §§ 1601-1677; Magnuson-Moss Warranty
Act, id. §§ 2301-2312.
108. See, e.g., Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905);
Fergerstrom v. Hawaiian Ocean View Estates, 50 Hawaii 374, 441 P.2d 141 (1968); Eick v.
Perk Dog Food, 347 Ill. App. 293, 106 N.E.2d 742 (1952). See generally Green, The Right
of Privacy, 27 ILL. L. REv. 237 (1932); Treece, Commercial Exploitation of Names, Like-
nesses, and Personal Histories, 51 TEx. L. REv. 637 (1973).
109. See Treece, supra note 108, at 638-41. Professor Treece also argues that an un-
authorized endorsement does economic damage to the individual portrayed, since it
deprives the person of the money the advertiser would have given him to obtain the en-
dorsement. Id. at 641-48. This will be true, however, only if the courts or legislatures are
willing to provide a remedy for unauthorized endorsements; in the absence of such a
remedy, economic harm of this type would not occur, since the advertiser could freely
use portrayals. While the argument that an unauthorized endorsement represents unfair
appropriation of another's services has a strong equitable appeal, it cannot be translated
into economic damage to the individual portrayed until a legal right, based on some in-
dependent social policy, has been established.
1600
Media Portrayals
harm that this policy seeks to prevent is linked to both personal and
economic interests.
When the harm inflicted by a media portrayal is essentially economic
in nature, still another social policy applies: that of encouraging in-
dividual achievement by allowing people to profit from their own
efforts. The underlying assumption is that the greater the possibilities
for personal profit, the more likely people are to pursue creative
activities. The copyright laws are one expression of this policy," 0 but
their reach is somewhat limited, especially when measured against the
capabilities of modem media. As a result, additional remedies are
needed to fulfill this social policy. These remedies can extend to virtu-
ally any recognizable attribute of a person that has become marketable
as a result of that person's efforts-his face, characterization, voice, play-
ing statistics, or even his distinctive racing car.11
There are thus two sets of social policies connected with the por-
trayal of real people by the media. The first, which is related to free
speech, focuses on the purpose of the portrayal and acts as a limit on
the ability of the individual to obtain relief. The second, and necessarily
subsidiary, set of policies involves the freedom of the individual, the
guarantee of fair commercial practice, and the encouragement of per-
sonal endeavor. These policies focus on the harm suffered by the in-
dividual and provide a basis on which the individual can obtain
relief. Because these two sets of policies have guided courts in reaching
their decisions in the area of media portrayals, it is from these policies
that principles explaining the prevailing pattern of the court decisions
can be derived.
B. The Principle of Media Purpose
In view of the predominant policy favoring freedom of expression,
an analysis of media portrayals should begin by considering the purpose
of the portrayal in question.1'2 If the portrayal is deemed to serve a
110. See Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) ("ultimate
aim" of copyright law is "to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good"); 1
NIMMER, supra note 11, § 1.03[A], at 1-28 ("[Tjhe primary purpose of copyright is not to
reward the author but is rather to secure 'the general benefits derived by the public from
the labors of authors'. ) (quoting Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932)).
111. See note 69 supra (citing cases).
112. The more common method of analysis, it should be noted, is to begin with the
type of harm alleged by the plaintiff, rather with than the type of portrayal. See Zacchini
v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 569-73 (1977); Ettore v. Philco Television
Broadcasting Corp., 229 F.2d 481, 485-86 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 926 (1956); W.
PROSSER, supra note 11, § 117, at 804-14. The difficulty with this approach is that it creates
a presumption in favor of compensation, thereby ignoring First Amendment concerns and
requiring them to be factored in at a subsequent stage of the analysis. See pp. 1585-88,
1590-91 supra.
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socially useful function by contributing to either public debate or
general culture, it will be entitled to First Amendment protection and
will almost always be immune from liability. The most common reason
why courts decide that a particular portrayal is not entitled to such
protection is that it exploits the individual portrayed. In other words,
the portrayal has no appreciable value as either public information or
as creative entertainment, but simply makes use of the individual's
attributes. 13 The operation of this principle can be demonstrated by
considering decided cases involving each of the three basic types of
media portrayals-those designed to inform, those designed to enter-
tain, and those designed to sell a product.
As indicated above, informative portrayals-those intended to de-
scribe the real world-are given the most far-reaching First Amendment
protection because they are seen as essential to public debate of political
or social issues. There are, however, certain types of information that
are considered to be of little value for this purpose. A primary example
is a portrayal that is incorrect, in the sense that it purports to convey
information about a person's involvement with an issue of genuine
public concern, when the person in fact has no connection with that
issue." 4 In such cases, connecting the person portrayed with the issue
serves no socially valuable function; it merely makes use of the person's
attributes. Alternatively, media portrayals may provide information
that is true, but that is irrelevant to any issue that may be part of the
public decisionmaking process. Such portrayals derive their appeal
from the mere fact that they divulge personal information that would
not otherwise be available to the public." 5 This material may be of
113. The term exploitation is used here in the sense of selfish use of another's at-
tributes for one's own ends without authorization. It should be distinguished from
another meaning-that of turning one's own attributes to commercial advantage or
authorizing others to do so. The latter usage is often found in entertainment industry
agreements.
114. See, e.g., Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245 (1974) (entirely
fabricated interview in newspaper story held actionable); Peay v. Curtis Publishing Co.,
78 F. Supp. 305 (D.D.C. 1948) (picture of honest cab driver illustrating article about dis-
honesty of cabdrivers held actionable); Metzger v. Dell Publishing Co., 207 Misc. 182, 136
N.Y.S.2d 888 (Sup. Ct. 1955) (photograph incorrectly identifying boy as gang member held
actionable). As the Supreme Court stated in the defamation context, "there is no constitu-
tional value in false statements of fact." Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340
(1974). It is possible, however, that such false statements will be protected nonetheless if
they are clearly presented as fictional and have sufficient cultural value. See pp. 1604-05
infra.
115. See, e.g., Barber v. Time, Inc., 348 Mo. 1199, 159 S.W.2d 291 (1942) (identification
by name and photograph of woman who suffered from unusual ailment); cf. Doe v. Roe,
42 A.D.2d 559, 345 N.Y.S.2d 560, alf'd, 33 N.Y.2d 902, 307 N.E.2d 823, 352 N.Y.S.2d 626
(1973), cert. granted, 417 U.S. 907 (1974), cert. dismissed, 420 U.S. 307 (1975) (publication
of psychiatric case history).
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enormous "public interest," in the sense that there is a ready market
for it. It serves no First Amendment function, however, and is thus
essentially exploitative in nature. For example, the fact that a partic-
ular person used to be a prostitute or a thief, or that a particular
person is suffering from an unusual ailment,116 although informative in
the strictest sense, is a kind of information that is not regarded as
immune from liability. In contrast, an account of personal affairs that
is connected to any matter of independent news value, whether to a
larger issue or to a person who has previously been the subject of valid
news, will probably be protected. 117
In making determinations of this kind, courts consider the form of
the portrayal as well as its content. Form provides courts with a means
of gauging the underlying purpose of the portrayal at issue. Thus the
poster of comedian Pat Paulsen was held to be news partially because
posters are such a familiar mode of campaign dialogue."18 But the
poster of Elvis Presley, labeled "In Memory," was denied protected
status as an announcement of death." 9 The court in the latter case
declined to state its reasons, 20 but at least one reason must have been
the fact that full-color wall posters are simply not a common form of
obituary notice. A similar consideration probably accounts for the out-
come in Zacchini, in which the Supreme Court held that a news story
about a human cannonball act would be protected under the First
Amendment, but that broadcasting the entire act would not be.' 2 This
conclusion appears to be based on the belief that broadcasting an entire
act is more similar in form to the commercial broadcast of a sporting
116. See, e.g., Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 4 Cal. 3d 529, 483 P.2d 34, 93 Cal. Rptr.
866 (1971) (thief); Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91 (Ct. App. 1931) (prostitute);
Barber v. Time, Inc., 348 Mo. 1199, 159 S.W.2d 291 (1942) (disease).
117. See, e.g., Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 58 Misc. 2d 1, 294
N.Y.S.2d 122 (Sup. Ct. 1968), aff'd mem., 32 A.D.2d 892, 301 N.Y.S.2d 948 (1969) (biography
of Howard Hughes is matter of public interest to which privacy and publicity interests must
yield); Meetze v. Associated Press, 230 S.C. 330, 95 S.E.2d 606 (1956) (birth of child to pre-
teenager an event of public interest).
118. Paulsen v. Personality Posters, Inc., 59 Misc. 2d 444, 449-50, 299 N.Y.S.2d 501, 507-
08 (Sup. Ct. 1968); cf. Davis v. Duryea, N.Y. Law Journal, June 7, 1979 at 10, col. 5
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 6, 1979) (use of news photograph of person in political campaign
constitutionally protected as part of valid public debate).
119. Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S.
Ct. 1215 (1979).
120. The court's explanation for distinguishing the Paulsen case was stated, in full, as
follows: "We cannot accept Pro Arts contention that the legend 'IN MEMORY . . .
placed its poster in the same category as one picturing a presidential candidate, albeit a
mock candidate. We hold, therefore, that Pro Arts' poster of Presley was not privileged as
celebrating a newsworthy event." Id. at 222 (ellipsis in original).
121. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 574-75 (1977).
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event, which has long been recognized as a matter of license,122 than it
is to an informative report about the results of the event.
123
When dealing with portrayals designed primarily for entertainment
purposes, courts have employed a similar distinction between por-
trayals that serve a social function and those that are essentially ex-
ploitative in nature. A social function for entertainment portrayals can
be based on the work's informative component or on its aesthetic
qualities. Portrayals intended primarily as entertainment often contain
information by depicting real people. This is generally regarded as
sufficient to fulfill the public-issue requirement of the First Amend-
ment; consequently, works of this kind will be protected to the same
extent as purely informative works. 24 A non-informative entertainment
portrayal, on the other hand, must rely on its own creative elements as
the basis of its claim of social value; if it is the product of some
observable creative effort, it will often be deemed worthy of protection.
Thus a fictitious work may safely use the names or attributes of real
people, provided that the resulting portrayal is clearly presented as
fiction. 125 But a work that merely capitalizes on the attributes of
122. See Pittsburgh Athletic Co. v. KQV Broadcasting Co., 24 F. Supp. 490 (W.D. Pa.
1938). The broadcast of an entire sporting event is regarded as a commercial product,
rather than news, and an unauthorized use can thus be found exploitative.
123. Form also serves as a basis for decision by providing a measure of the seriousness
of a portrayal. A thoughtful, carefully presented portrayal, e.g., Taylor v. K.T.V.B., 96
Idaho 202, 525 P.2d 984 (1974) (news coverage); Toscani v. Hersey, 271 A.D. 445, 65
N.Y.S.2d 814 (1946) (novel by John Hersey), is more likely to be shielded from liability
than a sensationalized presentation, e.g., Sutton v. Hearst Corp., 277 A.D. 155, 98 N.Y.S.2d
233 (1950) (sensationalized article about personal relationship); Aquino v. Bulletin Co.,
190 Pa. Super. 528, 154 A.2d 422 (1959) (sensationalized account of wedding and divorce).
This is often true because a thoughtful, serious work is generally linked to subjects of
public debate, while sensational accounts frequently do little more than reveal personal in-
formation for its own sake. This same consideration can be seen as an important factor
in some of the Supreme Court's defamation decisions. See Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 47
U.S.L.W. 4827 (U.S. June 26, 1979) (satirical critique of federal grantee in context of at-
tack on government spending); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976) (flippant ac-
count of socialite's divorce).
Of course, sensationalism alone does not deprive a work of First Amendment protection.
See Frosch v. Grossett & Dunlap, Inc., No. 10527/75 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 29, 1979) (biog-
raphy, even if sensational, is constitutionally protected). However, it often constitutes
evidence that the work may lack independent value.
124. See, e.g., Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1066 (2d Cir. 1977) ("It is immaterial
to [plaintiffs'] privacy claim whether Nizer's book is viewed as an historical or a fictional
work."); Toscani v. Hersey, 271 A.D. 445, 65 N.Y.S.2d 814 (1946).
125. E.g., Hicks v. Casablanca Records & Filmworks, 464 F. Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)
(film based on entirely fictionalized incident in Agatha Christie's life protected by First
Amendment); Leopold v. Levin, 45 111. 2d 434, 259 N.E.2d 250 (1970) (heavily fictionalized
film based on lives of Leopold and Loeb protected by First Amendment). But cf. Polakoff
v. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 3 MEDA L. REP. (BNA) 2516 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978)
(fictionalized account of real attorney's involvement with Lucky Luciano held actionable
as invasion of privacy).
Similarly, a casual reference in an otherwise independent work will not incur liability.
1604
Media Portrayals
another, without contributing anything substantially unique or new,
is likely to be subject to liability.126 In works of the latter type, nothing
is added to our cultural experience; consequently, the First Amend-
ment protection generally provided for creative work is not available.127
The distinction between imitation and parody is based on the same
principle. Imitation is primarily an attempt to duplicate the char-
acteristics of another, either to delude the public or to compensate for
an absence of creative effort. Parody, on the other hand, makes use of
another's attributes as part of a larger presentation, in which a consider-
able amount of the content is provided by the parodist. For this rea-
son, imitation is generally actionable, 28 while parody tends to be
protected.120 However, if a self-proclaimed parody actually appro-
priates substantial amounts of the original material, and thus relies on
the original rather than its own contributions for its appeal, it will not
be protected, no matter how humorous its intent. 3 0
See, e.g., Stillman v. Paramount Pictures Corp., I Misc. 2d 108, 147 N.Y.S.2d 504 (Sup. Ct.
1956) (single reference to "Stillman's Gym" in motion picture The Country Girl); Shubert
v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 189 Misc. 734, 72 N.Y.S.2d 851 (Sup. Ct. 1947), affd, 274 A.D.
751, 80 N.Y.S.2d 724 (1948) (two references to Shubert-owned theater in motion picture
The Jolson Story).
126. See Sinatra v. Wilson, 2 MFDiA L. REP. (BNA) 2008, 2010 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (allegation
that biography of Frank Sinatra was deliberately or recklessly false states valid cause of
action); Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 21 N.Y.2d 124, 233 N.E.2d 840, 286 N.Y.S.2d 832
(1967), appeal dismissed, 393 U.S. 1046 (1969) (deliberately false account of baseball player
Warren Spahn's life presented as factual biography incurs liability).
127. Cases of this sort clearly demand judgments as to the general nature, purpose and
value of the portrayals at issue; being inevitable, these judgments should be explicitly
acknowledged. For example, in University of Notre Dame du Lac v. Twentieth Century-
Fox Film Corp., 44 Misc. 2d 808, 255 N.Y.S.2d 210 (Sup. Ct. 1964), rev'd, 22 A.D.2d 452, 256
N.Y.S.2d 301, aff'd, 15 N.Y.2d 940, 207 N.E.2d 508, 259 N.Y.S.2d 832 (1965), the lower
court concluded that a motion picture, John Goldfarb, Please Come Home, had misappro-
priated the name of Notre Dame University, and its president, Father Hesburgh. It based
this opinion, at least in part, on its view that the motion picture was "ugly, vulgar and
tawdry." 44 Misc. 2d at 814, 255 N.Y.S.2d at 217. The Appellate Division, in reversing,
characterized the motion picture as a "broad farce" and a "blunderbuss travesty" that did
not constitute misappropriation. 22 A.D.2d at 453, 256 N.Y.S.2d at 303. It seems clear
that the Appellate Division's more charitable view of the motion picture's social value
contributed heavily to its conclusion that the picture was not a commercial exploitation of
the University or its president.
128. See, e.g., Lahr v. Adell Chem. Co., 300 F.2d 256 (Ist Cir. 1962) (commercial
using imitation of Bert Lahr's voice states cause of action for unfair competition); Chaplin
v. Amador, 93 Cal. App. 358, 269 P. 544 (Ct. App. 1928) (imitation of Charles Chaplin's
manner of dress and behavior, using name "Charlie Aplin," constitutes unfair competition);
Lombardo v. Doyle, Dane & Bernbach, Inc., 58 A.D.2d 620, 396 N.Y.S.2d 661 (1977) (com-
mercial depicting imitation of Guy Lombardo as "Mr. New Year's Eve" states cause of
action for violating right of publicity).
129. See, e.g., Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541 (2d Cir. 1964) (Mad
Magazine parody of Irving Berlin song lyrics protected speech); Bloom 8- Hamlin v.
Nixon, 125 F. 977 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1903) (parody of actress, including singing of copyrighted
song, not actionable).
130. See Walt Disney Productions v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978) (under-
ground comic book using characters based on Walt Disney cartoons constitutes copyright
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The third category of portrayals consists of those that neither in-
form nor entertain, but that serve primarily to sell a product. Portrayals
of this kind are exploitative by their very nature: they derive their
appeal from the commercial possibilities of a particular celebrity's
name, likeness, or other attributes. There are various merchandising
portrayals that fall into this category. Placing a picture of a person's
face on a T-shirt, for example, has little informative or cultural value;
the appeal of such a product depends primarily on the appeal of the
person portrayed. 31 It is this dependence on the person and the absence
of socially valued purposes in First Amendment terms, rather than the
commercial use per se, that renders portrayals in this area more
vulnerable to liability. The unauthorized use of a person's attributes
to create or sell a product, therefore, will typically lie outside the scope
of First Amendment protection and thus will often incur liability.32
However, a person is free to sell the right to use his attributes for such
purposes; 33 indeed, the law encourages the transferability of this right
as an incentive to commercial enterprise.
34
infringement); Benny v. Loew's, Inc., 239 F.2d 532, 536 (9th Cir. 1956) (Jack Benny's
television sketch based on motion picture Gas Light constitutes copyright infringement
because, "[i]f the material taken by [Benny] from 'Gas Light' is eliminated, there are left
only a few gags, and some disconnected and incoherent dialogue.")
Many of the imitation and parody cases have involved portrayals of fictional work
rather than real people and have thus been decided under copyright law. It seems rea-
sonable to assume, however, that privacy or publicity suits in this area would employ simi-
lar standards: namely, the substantiality of the imitation and the amount of independent
creativity involved. But cf. Price v. Worldvision Enterprises, Inc., 455 F. Supp. 252 (S.D.N.Y.
1978) (enjoining television series that contemplated use of Laurel and Hardy comedy
routines). The Price case appears to define prohibited imitation much more broadly; it is
not conclusive, however, since the issue was raised in the context of a res judicata discus-
sion, and the First Amendment implications were never considered. See note 190 infra.
131. Commercial uses that are similar to pure merchandising in form but have rec-
ognizable informative or cultural value will be protected. See, e.g., Booth v. Curtis
Publishing Co., 11 N.Y.2d 907, 182 N.E.2d 812, 228 N.Y.S.2d 468 (1962) (photograph used
in advertisement related to news story); Davis v. Duryea, N.Y. Law Journal, June 7, 1979,
at 10, col. 5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 6, 1979) (photograph used in political advertising).
132. See note 69 supra (citing cases). The most far-reaching case is Motschenbacher v.
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 827 (9th Cir. 1974), in which use of plaintiff's
distinctive racing car in a cigarette advertisement was held actionable, despite the fact
that plaintiff was not visible at the wheel, and that all identifying symbols had been
painted out. Such a holding would be inconceivable if the portrayal were used in an
informative or entertainment vehicle; it is only possible when a purely commercial and
thus essentially exploitative portrayal is involved.
133. See, e.g., Cepeda v. Swift 9: Co., 415 F.2d 1205 (8th Cir. 1969) (athlete's authorized
autograph, once purchased, can be used to promote frankfurters as well as sports goods);
Dahl v. Columbia Pictures, 12 Misc. 2d 574, 166 N.Y.S.2d 708 (1957) (consent to use like-
ness in promoting motion picture Wicked as They Come extends to poses more revealing
than those appearing in motion picture).
134. In encouraging commercial enterprise, see note 102 sukpra, the law has long treated
the sale of the privacy, publicity and related rights in one's attributes according to the
general principles of contract law. See, e.g., Long v. Decca Records, 76 N.Y.S.2d 133 (Sup.
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The principle of media purpose can also be applied to libel cases.
Being false by definition, actionable libel will not usually serve an
informative function, nor is it likely to be presented in a manner con-
sidered culturally valuable.135 Consequently, libel may generally be
said to exploit the individual portrayed and not to be entitled to
absolute First Amendment protection. 1 6 The difficulty is that remedies
against libel can act as a threat against those who fulfill informative or
cultural functions, but lack the time or resources to be certain that their
statements are not libelous.137 Consequently, the Supreme Court has
held that the First Amendment dictates the degree of fault that must
be demonstrated before damages can be recovered.
As far as the issue of fault is concerned, an approach could be
developed in which a lesser degree of exploitation will result in the
application of the actual malice standard,138 while portrayals that re-
flect a more exploitative use of the name or personal characteristics of
an individual will be actionable on the basis of negligence. The Su-
preme Court has articulated a rather different guideline, to be sure,
based on whether the person libeled is a "public" or a "private"
figure. 139 This test seems confusing, however, and has led to results that
are often difficult to reconcile with the Court's own criteria.1 40 In
fact, the Court's focus on the "nature and extent of an individual's
participation in the particular controversy giving rise to the defama-
Ct. 1947); Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 222 N.Y. 88, 118 N.E. 214 (1917). The con-
tractual approach can also operate as a limiting principle, of course, should the purchaser
exceed his contractual rights. See, e.g., Manger v. Kree Institute of Electrolysis, 233 F.2d
5 (2d Cir. 1956) (liability imposed when prize-winning essay on "Why I Am Glad I Chose
Electrolysis as a Career" published in altered form without author's consent).
135. A work that relied on its creative rather than its informative function as the
basis of its social value would most likely be presented as a fictionalization, in which
case it would usually not be considered libelous. Cf. Silver, supra note 18 (arguing that
libel law should not be applied to fictionalizations).
136. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) ("IT]here is no constitu-
tional value in false statements of fact. Neither the intentional lie nor the careless error
materially advances society's interest in 'uninhibited, robust and wide-open' debate on
public issues.")
137. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964); Anderson, Libel and
Press Self-Censorship, 53 U. TEx. L. REv. 422 (1975).
138. In this context, "actual malice" means knowing intent, not ill will. See Herbert
v. Lando, 99 S. Ct. 1635, 1661-62 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting); Rosenbloom v. Metro-
media, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 52 n.18 (1971) (plurality opinion).
139. See Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 47 U.S.L.W. 4827 (U.S. June 26, 1979); Wolston v.
Reader's Digest Ass'n, 47 U.S.L.W. 4840 (U.S. June 26, 1979); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
418 U.S. 323 (1974).
140. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976) (socially prominent woman,
married to member of extremely wealthy family, who had been involved in notorious,
17-month long divorce trial, and bad given several press conferences during course of trial,
held to be private person). As Justice Marshall indicated in dissent, id. at 484-90, Mrs.
Firestone met all the criteria for a public figure established by Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
418 U.S. 323 (1974).
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tion,"141 is more closely related to the principle of media purpose that
has been presented in this article than to its own distinction between
private and public figures. The principle of media purpose would sug-
gest that recovery should not be granted for negligent libel when some
justification exists for the portrayal in the sense that the person is con-
nected with the issue that is under discussion; instead, the higher
fault standard of actual malice should apply. But when the person is
improperly connected with that issue, being joined with it by mistake
or being too remotely related to it, there is a greater degree of exploita-
tion and any negligent libel should be actionable. Admittedly, the
analogy is imperfect, because the concept of media purpose presented in
this article is designed to apply to the entire legal analysis, not just the
issue of fault. In addition, no suggestion is being made that this stan-
dard can be used to predict or explain the outcomes of the decided
cases.142 But it is important to note that by focusing on the relationship
between the person portrayed and the issue involved, the Court has
adopted an analysis closer to the one presented here than to the Court's
own articulated rationale.
C. The Principle of Identifiable Harm
The second basic principle governing court decisions about media
portrayals is that a portrayal must cause identifiable harm before
relief will be granted. This principle is generally subordinated to the
first; if a portrayal is found to serve an informative or cultural func-
tion, it will generally be immune from liability, even if it causes sub-
stantial harm. If a portrayal is simply exploitative, however, the issue
of harm will be likely to control the court's decision.
This principle, which is a relatively common one in tort law, is also
influenced by First Amendment considerations. A clearly exploitative
141. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974). See Hutchinson v. Proxmire,
47 U.S.L.W. 4827 (U.S. June 26, 1979); Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1066 (2d Cir.
1977).
142. The standard does account for some of the recent cases holding negligent libel
actionable, namely, those cases in which the connection between the person portrayed and
the issue under discussion was incorrect or too remote. See, e.g., Hutchinson V. Proxmire,
47 U.S.L.W. 4827 (U.S. June 26, 1979) (scientist who merely received federal grant inap-
propriately used as prime example of wasteful government spending); Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (private lawyer representing client incorrectly connected
with discussion of communism in America). Other decisions applying the negligence stan-
dard run counter to the theory, however, see, e.g., Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 47
U.S.L.W. 4840 (U.S. June 26, 1979) (plaintiff convicted of contempt for not answering
subpoena in course of communist spy investigations of 1950s held to have cause of action
for book negligently referring to him as communist spy); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S.
448 (1976) (party in highly publicized trial held to have cause of action for negligent libel).
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portrayal is not protected by the First Amendment; courts tend, how-
ever, to avoid imposing liability when there is even a possibility of
such protection on the ground that First Amendment rights require
"breathing space."'I4 3 As a result, they grant recovery in cases in which
exploitation is found only if a clear showing of objectively determin-
able harm has been made. 44 The types of harm that will qualify are
derived from the countervailing social policies that support suits
against the media-the encouragement of individual freedom, honest
commercial practices, and creativity.
1. Non-Economic Harm
Most of the cases that invoke the right of privacy, such as those arising
from a disclosure of personal facts or portrayal in a false light, do not
involve direct economic injury. Identifiable harm in such cases is
usually determined by reference to objective standards other than direct
monetary loss. First, the media production must be generally recogniz-
able as a portrayal of the person who is bringing suit. A reference in
an informative or entertainment piece might be too elliptical or too
heavily fictionalized to meet this requirement 45 Mere depiction of
someone in the position of the plaintiff is not adequate; it must be the
plaintiff himself, clearly identified and extensively portrayed. 46
Secondly, the portrayal generally must constitute a disclosure of
143. See, e.g., Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 520-22 (1972); Keyishian v. Board of
Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 604 (1967). See generally note 89 suPra (discussion of chilling effect
doctrine).
144. The requirement that harm must occur before relief is granted is a general prin-
ciple of tort law. However, exceptions to the principle were made at common law for
actions involving defamation. See W. PROSSER, suPra note 11, § 112, at 754-64. As far as the
right of privacy is concerned, the way in which it was initially defined strongly suggested
that proof of damages should not be required for this sort of suit either. See Warren &
Brandeis, supra note 8, at 219 (drawing analogy to law of defamation). The same may be
said for the right of publicity. See Nimmer, sutpra note 66, at 216 (recommending measure-
ment of damages in terms of value of publicity to defendant, rather than in terms of
injury to plaintiff). However, as the principle of identifiable harm presented in this
article suggests, this position has not been accepted by the courts.
145. See, e.g., Levy v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 57 F. Supp. 40 (S.D.N.Y. 1944) (char-
acterization of George M. Cohan's wife in motion picture Yankee Doodle Dandy not
sufficiently similar to Cohan's first wife); Toscani v. Hersey, 271 A.D. 445, 65 N.Y.S.2d
814 (1946) (person used as model for character in John Hersey's A Bell for Adano in-
sufficiently recognizable); University of Notre Dame du Lac v. 20th Century-Fox Film
Corp., 22 A.D.2d 452, 256 N.Y.S.2d 301 (1964), affd, 15 N.Y.2d 940, 207 N.E.2d 508, 259
N.Y.S.2d 832 (1965) (fictional president of Notre Dame in motion picture John Goldfarb,
Please Come Home not sufficiently similar to Father Hesburgh).
146. An interesting effort to make the recognizability requirement an even more
stringent limit on privacy suits was presented in Negri v. Schering Corp., 333 F. Supp. 101
(S.D.N.Y. 1971). Defendant argued that the use of a 40 year old photograph of Pola Negri
in an advertisement was not actionable because the plaintiff no longer looked like her
picture, i.e., she was not recognizable as herself. The court rejected this argument.
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private information. Publication of the fact that a person committed a
crime many years ago may constitute such a disclosure, and thus provide
a basis for recovery, when the person portrayed has rehabilitated him-
self and established a new reputation. 147 This same disclosure would
probably not be a cognizable injury to a person who was publicly
known at the time of portrayal as a former criminal.14 A photograph
of a person in his private hospital room is likely to be actionable, but
a photograph of someone on a public street is not.149 The average
person can ordinarily recover for an unauthorized photograph of his
anatomy, but an exotic dancer will be barred from recovery. 50 Similar-
ly, the revelation that a person is in debt is actionable if his financial
condition is not known.151 The information at issue need not have been
widely known prior to the portrayal and the person need not be a
celebrity, in order for liability to be precluded; it is sufficient if the
information is known to people with whom the plaintiff regularly as-
sociates. Thus courts have consistently refused to grant relief when a
person's open activities, including his failures, love affairs, or character
flaws are portrayed, 52 and courts have applied this rule to both the
notorious and the obscure. 53
147. E.g., Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 4 Cal. 3d 529, 483 P.2d 34, 93 Cal. Rptr. 866
(1971); Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91 (Ct. App. 1931).
148. See Maritote v. Desilu Productions, Inc., 345 F.2d 418, 420 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 883 (1965) (dictum) (Al Capone would have no privacy claim for portrayal of his
past crimes).
149. Compare Barber v. Time, Inc., 348 Mo. 1199, 159 S.W.2d 291 (1942) (photograph
of patient in hospital room actionable) with Gill v. Hearst Publishing Co., 40 Cal. 2d 224,
253 P.2d 441 (1953) (photograph of couple embracing on public street not actionable).
150. Compare Banks v. King Features Syndicate, 30 F. Supp. 352 (S.D.N.Y. 1939)
(publication of x-rays of woman's body actionable) with Cabaniss v. Hipsley, 114 Ga. App.
367, 151 S.E.2d 496 (Ct. App. 1966) (publication of exotic dancer's photograph not action-
able).
151. E.g., Santiesteban v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 306 F.2d 9 (5th Cir. 1962)
(creditor liable for repossessing tires on non-delinquent debtor's car in full view of debtor's
employer and customers); Trammell v. Citizens News Co., 285 Ky. 529, 148 S.W.2d 708
(1941) (newspaper potentially liable for publishing notice of plaintiff's debt after notifica-
tion that debt was private matter).
152. See, e.g., Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311
U.S. 711 (1940) (failures); Virgil v. Sports Illustrated, 424 F. Supp. 1286 (S.D. Cal. 1976)
(bizarre characteristics); Carlisle v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., 201 Cal. App. 2d 733, 20 Cal.
Rptr. 405 (Ct. App. 1962) (love affairs). But see Cason v. Baskin, 155 Fla. 198, 20 So. 2d
243 (1944), aff'd, 159 Fla. 31, 30 So. 2d 635 (1947) (description of plaintiff, including certain
unpleasant characteristics, constituted invasion of privacy, but merited only nominal
damages).
153. E.g., Gill v. Hearst Publishing Co., 40 Cal. 2d 224, 253 P.2d 441 (1953) (portrayal
of public romantic activities of private persons is not actionable); Goelet v. Confidential,
Inc., 5 A.D.2d 226, 17 N.Y.S.2d 223 (1958) (same, for public person). The portrayal of a
person in a "false light" or distorted manner may be actionable, even though there is no
disclosure of actual facts. But false light cases generally deal with portrayals that are
defamatory. See, e.g., Gill v. Curtis Publishing Co., 38 Cal. 2d 273, 239 P.2d 630 (1952)
(picture of embracing couple used as example of carnal love); Metzger v. Dell Publishing
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Once a disclosure of private information has been proved, the plain-
tiff must still demonstrate that real injury has been sustained, again by
reference to an objective standard. The most persuasive evidence of
such injury is some disruption in the plaintiff's life, such as an adverse
change in a relationship, or subjection to public contumely. In Briscoe
v. Reader's Digest Association, for example, the plaintiff asserted that he
had been "scorned and abandoned" by his eleven year old daughter and
his friends after publication of a story recounting his long-past crime;
this constituted a clear, objective circumstance on which to base re-
covery.1
5 4
If there has been no such objective damage, the plaintiff must rely
upon a showing of emotional injury. Such injury can be translated into
an objective standard by analogy to the tort law's familiar "reasonable
man" test. Consequently, a disclosure must be clearly and universally
perceived as humiliating-it must "outrage the community's notions of
decency"' 5-before relief will be granted. For example, recovery was
allowed where a nude figure impersonating Muhammad Ali appeared
in a magazine devoted largely to sexual matters156 and, in Barber v.
Co., 207 Misc. 2d 182, 136 N.Y.S.2d 888 (Sup. Ct. 1955) (picture of boy incorrectly
identified as that of gang member); cf. W. PROSSER, supra note 11, § 117, at 813 ("The false
light need not necessarily be a defamatory one, although it very often is, so that a def-
amation action will also lie.") (footnotes omitted). Most of the remaining false light cases
would be actionable invasions of privacy or publicity if the facts had been correctly
presented. See, e.g., Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245 (1974) (newspaper
liable for printing invented interview describing personal feelings of woman whose
husband had died several months before); Jumez v. ABC Records, Inc., 3 MEDIA L. REP.
(BNA) 2324 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (record company liable to plaintiff for unauthorized use of
photograph on cover of album recorded by plaintiff, even though photograph not that of
plaintiff); Nimmer, The Right to Speak From Times to Time: First Amendment Theory
Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CALIF. L. RaV. 935, 963-67 (1968). More-
over, misinterpretations, or even demonstrable mistakes, are not actionable when the
portrayal is found to have a socially valuable purpose. See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374
(1967) (incorrect portrayal of family's victimization by criminal protected as matter of
public interest); Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir. 1977) (account of incidents sur-
rounding Rosenberg spy trial, whether accurate or inaccurate, protected as matter of
public interest).
154. 4 Cal. 3d 529, 533, 483 P.2d 34, 36, 93 Cal. Rptr. 866, 868 (1971); see Melvin v.
Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 292, 297 P. 91, 93 (Ct. App. 1931) (plaintiff had "her reputation
and social standing destroyed by the publication of the story of her former depravity" in
motion picture, The Red Kimono); Tooley v. Canal Motors, Inc., 296 So. 2d 453, 453-54
(La. App. 1974) (plaintiff's professional standing as attorney injured by radio advertise-
ment).
155. Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 809 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 711
(1940).
156. Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). Terms such as "outrage"
and "decency" often arise in suits involving portrayals that carry sexual implications.
See, e.g., Garner v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 97 F. Supp. 546 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) (article
describing allegedly improper details of sexual relations); Banks v. King Features Syndicate,
30 F. Supp. 352 (S.D.N.Y. 1939) (x-rays of woman's pelvis); Daily Times Democrat v.
Graham, 276 Ala. 380, 162 So. 2d 474 (1964) (photograph of woman with skirt blown up
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Time, Inc., 57 where a news magazine recounted the details of a
woman's insatiable appetite with unnecessary specificity and relish.
Courts will not recognize the claims of those who are merely sensitive
to publicity, however, nor of those who have a penchant for secrecy. 15
Thus, they have refused to grant recovery for the disclosure of facts
about a relative of the plaintiff.159 Moreover, courts are careful to
distinguish between the humiliation caused by an event and the
humiliation caused by the event's publication. Thus, they have refused
to permit claims by the victims of crimes, because it is generally the
crime itself, and not the portrayal recounting it, that is the true source
of the plaintiff's distress.0 ° In all these cases, the plaintiff's feelings may
be genuinely injured, but the injury is too subjective and thus insuffi-
ciently identifiable.
The courts' insistence on a showing of identifiable harm is based on
one of the social policies that support suits against the media: the con-
cern with maximizing individual freedom. Unless the portrayal causes
identifiable injury, there is no clear indication that it has acted as a
constraint on the person's activities. Thus, courts will grant relief where
the portrayal has led to an objectively observable disruption or gen-
erally recognized humiliation. But subjective injuries to feelings will
not be recognized as being a sufficiently serious restraint on a person's
freedom of action to justify recovery.
A type of harm that is partially personal and partially economic
is the unauthorized endorsement of a commercial product. Portrayals
by wind machine); Gill v. Curtis Publishing Co., 38 Cal. 2d 273, 239 P.2d 630 (1952)
(photograph of embracing couple used to illustrate article about dangers of carnal love);
Semler v. Ultem Publications, Inc., 170 Misc. 551, 9 N.Y.S.2d 319 (City Ct. 1938) (photo-
graph in magazine making "an appeal to sex").
In fact, Professor Hill has suggested that the "shocking character of a disclosure" could
provide a general standard for determining whether media portrayals should be subject
to liability. Hill, supra note 23, at 1258. But the concept of a shocking disclosure is
difficult to apply; it seems to relate to the relationship between the portrayal and an
actual or hypothetical audience, rather than to the relationship between the portrayal and
the person being portrayed.
157. 348 Mo. 1199, 159 S.W.2d 291 (1942).
158. See, e.g., Gill v. Hearst Publishing Co., 40 Cal. 2d 224, 253 P.2d 441 (1953) (photo-
graph of couple embracing in public not actionable); Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v.
Random House, Inc., 58 Misc. 2d 1, 294 N.Y.S.2d 122 (Sup. Ct. 1968), aff'd mere., 32 A.D.2d
892, 301 N.Y.S.2d 948 (1969) (biography of Howard Hughes not actionable).
159. See, e.g., Maritote v. Desilu Productions, Inc., 345 F.2d 418 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 883 (1965) (portrayal of Al Capone after his death cannot serve as basis for suit
brought by widow and child); Rozhon v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 230 F.2d 359, 362
(7th Cir. 1956) (plaintiff unable to claim invasion of privacy for article about son's death
from narcotics).
160. See, e.g., Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975) (publication of rape
victim's name); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967) (account of family's victimization
by criminal); Jenkins v. Dell Publishing Co., 251 F.2d 447 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S.
921 (1958) (account of murder in crime magazine).
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of this kind are almost always actionable' because the requirement of
identifiability is relatively easy to meet. The injury arises from the
false implication of a business relationship between the advertiser and
the individual portrayed, an implication that misrepresents the in-
dividual's transactions. This injury is easily recognized. In order to
decide whether an unauthorized endorsement has been presented, a
court need only examine the advertisement itself to determine whether
it states or implies an endorsement, and then examine the relationship
between the parties, as it would in any contract case, to determine
whether they had agreed to such a result.102 In the absence of a finding
that such an agreement exists, a court will generally impose liability
to support the social policy of encouraging honest commercial prac-
tices.1 63
2. Economic Harm
In contrast to those portrayals that cause non-economic harm, there
are others that lead to economic injury by limiting the person's
ability to profit from his name, likeness, characteristics, or activities.
Once again, the crucial issue is identifiability. If the plaintiff sustains
an objectively ascertainable economic loss from the portrayal, damages
will frequently be granted. If the loss is hypothetical or speculative,
there will generally be no recovery, even if the very same type of
portrayal is involved.
In order to prove an economic loss of the requisite identifiability, a
person must have been in the process of earning money from the
161. See, e.g., Fergerstrom v. Hawaiian Ocean View Estates, 50 Hawaii 374, 441 P.2d
141 (1968); Eick v. Perk Dog Food Co., 347 Ill. App. 293, 106 N.E.2d 742 (1952).
162. Questions concerning the nature and extent of an authorization can be settled by
familiar principles of contract law. See, e.g., Johnson v. Boeing Airplane Co., 175 Kan.
275, 262 P.2d 808 (1953) (plaintiff held to have waived right to object to reuse of authorized
photograph); Young v. Greneker Studios, Inc., 175 Misc. 1027, 26 N.Y.S.2d 357 (Sup. Ct.
1941) (prohibiting sale of copies of mannequin modeled on employee without employee's
consent). A misappropriation claim of this sort may be combined with a right of publicity
claim. For example, a celebrity may assert that he has not only been misrepresented by
a particular endorsement, but that his general ability to earn money from an inde-
pendently established business activity has been reduced. See, e.g., Grant v. Esquire, Inc.,
367 F. Supp. 876 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (actor); Hogan v. A.S. Barnes 9- Co., 114 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
314 (Pa. Ct. C.P. Phila. County 1957) (athlete). But to sustain such a claim, the celebrity
must prove that he generally earns money from that particular kind of activity.
163. This same rule would apply to a false endorsement used for political rather than
commercial purposes. Cf. Davis v. Duryea, N.Y. Law Journal, June 7, 1979, at 10, col. 5
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 6, 1979) (use of photograph in political campaign protected where no
suggestion of endorsement involved). The social policy favoring honest political practices
is clearly established. See Federal Election Campaign Act, 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-441, 451-454
(1976 & Supp. 1979).
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particular attributes appropriated by the portrayal. Evidence to this ef-
fect would be a contract granting another party the exclusive right to
use the attribute in question. An unauthorized portrayal can reduce
the value of that contract, and limit the person's ability to sell any
other exclusive rights. For example, in Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v.
Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 64 the case in which the right of publicity
was born, the plaintiff sued and prevailed on the basis of an exclusive
contract right to use the photographs of certain baseball players.
Similarly, a series of recent cases has validated exclusive marketing
agreements that Elvis Presley entered into before his death.1 5 One court
described Presley as having "carved out a separate intangible property
right for himself" by granting these exclusive rights.'",
Where no exclusive contract is present, courts tend to grant relief
only to those who clearly earn their livelihood from the appropriated
attribute.167 In Zacchini, the Supreme Court pointed out that the
performance at issue was unique to the plaintiff's family and em-
phasized that the broadcast had gone "to the heart of [the plaintiff's]
ability to earn a living as an entertainer." 68 Other cases in which
grounds for recovery were found involved the unauthorized use of an
actor's likeness, characterization, or distinctive voice, each of which was
clearly central to the person's career. 6 9 And in one case involving an
unauthorized board game, the court explicitly noted that income from
endorsements constituted a substantial portion of the plaintiff's earn-
ings. 70
Not only must the plaintiff earn money from his attributes, but the
164. 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953). See Uhlaender v. Henrick-
sen, 316 F. Supp. 1277 (D. Minn. 1970) (unauthorized sale of board game using playing
statistics enjoined where baseball players involved had formed association to grant exclu-
sive rights to use these statistics).
165. Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 288 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), affl'd, 579
F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 1215 (1979); Factors Etc., Inc. v. Creative
Card Co., 444 F. Supp. 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Memphis Dev. Foundation v. Factors Etc.,
Inc., 441 F. Supp. 1323 (W.D. Tenn. 1977).
166. Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215, 221 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
99 S. Ct. 1215 (1979).
167. See, e.g., Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723, 729 (1978); Grant v. Esquire, Inc.,
367 F. Supp. 876, 881 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (court could "take judicial notice that there is a
fairly active market for exploitation of the faces, names and reputations of celebrities.")
168. 433 U.S. at 576.
169. Lahr v. Adell Chem. Co., 300 F.2d 256 (1st Cir. 1962) (Bert Lahr's voice); Grant
v. Esquire, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 876 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (Cary Grant's photograph); Lugosi v.
Universal Pictures Co., 172 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 541 (Super. Ct. L.A. County 1972), rev'd on
other grounds, 139 Cal. Rptr. 35 (Ct. App. 1977) (Bela Lugosi's "Dracula" characterization).
170. Palmer v. Schonhorn Enterprises, Inc., 96 N.J. Super. 72, 74, 232 A.2d 458, 459
(Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1967); see Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277, 1283 (D. Minn.
1970) ("A name is commercially valuable as an endorsement of a product or for use for
financial gain only because the public recognizes it ....")
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attributes involved must be precisely those on which the claim is
based.' 71 In addition, the plaintiff must be able to identify actual
economic damage resulting from the portrayal. In many imitation
cases, courts have refused to grant recovery because the plaintiff was
unable to prove that the imitation of a singing or acting style, by itself,
caused economic injury. 172 But where it can be proved that the por-
trayal impairs the earnings of the person portrayed, recovery may be
granted.
7 3
Once again, this requirement that the plaintiff demonstrate identi-
fiable harm can be traced directly to one of the underlying social
policies that motivates the courts to grant recovery against portrayals;
in this case, it is the policy of encouraging creative endeavor. The sup-
position is that protection of a demonstrated ability to make a profit
from one's attributes encourages individuals to pursue socially desir-
able activities. As a result, courts will often find an existing plan to
exploit one's own attributes persuasive in granting recovery against a
competing use, but will deny recovery on the basis of economic harm
when the plaintiff is unable to demonstrate commercial benefit to
himself from the attributes portrayed, and a corresponding loss of such
benefit as a result of the portrayal.
171. See, e.g., Booth v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 362 F. Supp. 343 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
Shirley Booth complained that a characterization she had created had been imitated in an
advertisement. Recovery was denied on the ground that this characterization was not
sufficiently associated with or recognizable as Booth so that its use caused identifiable
harm to her career. Cf. Lahr v. Adell Chem. Co., 300 F.2d 256 (1st Cir. 1962) (imitation
of Bert Lahr's voice states cause of action). In refusing to grant summary judgment for
the defendant, the Lahr court held that the plaintiff had to prove that his voice was
generally recognized, that there was a market for his performances, and that this market
was a limited one, so that the imitation would deprive Lahr of performance opportunities,
thus causing identifiable economic harm to him.
In National Football League v. Governor of Del., 435 F. Supp. 1372 (D. Del. 1977), the
plaintiff NFL sued to enjoin Delaware from using the results of its games as the basis
of a state-sponsored lottery. Although the court did not trouble itself to distinguish the
board game cases, those cases are in fact distinguishable; professional athletes frequently
earn income by giving testimonials, but the NFL is not in the business of gambling on
the results of its games. As a result, the NFL was not able to demonstrate identifiable
economic damage from the lottery and could not recover on a right of publicity argument.
172. See Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
402 U.S. 906 (1970) (imitation of singing style, by itself, does not state cause of action when
no injury to plaintiff can be shown); Davis v. Trans World Airlines, 297 F. Supp. 1145
(C.D. Cal. 1965) (same).
173. See Lahr v. Adell Chem. Co., 300 F.2d 256 (Ist Cir. 1962) (imitation of voice
actionable if economic loss can be proved); Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277
(D. Minn. 1970) (use of playing statistics actionable because it caused measurable decrease
in plaintiff's earnings from such information); cf. De Costa v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys.,
Inc., 520 F.2d 499, 512-13 (1st Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1073 (1976) (although
defendant copied plaintiff's characterization of cowboy character "Paladin," plaintiff not
entitled to relief because he had never received financial benefit from his characteriza-
tion).
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The principle of identifiable harm that operates in privacy and
publicity decisions, like the principle of media purpose, can be applied
to the decisions in libel cases. A libel action, like an action based on
privacy or publicity, requires a recognizable portrayal. 7 4 Moreover,
libel law requires a plaintiff to demonstrate that the portrayal caused
harm according to an objective standard. 7 5 The one notable difference
between privacy or publicity standards and defamation standards is
that the common law will sustain a libel suit without proof of special
damages. 7 6 But this is exactly the rule that the Supreme Court reached
out to restrict in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 77 Although permitting
defamation suits to prevail on a showing of negligence, the Gertz Court
stated that damages must be limited to "compensation for actual in-
jury" unless the higher standard of recklessness could be met.'76 In so
doing, the Court essentially brought the damage requirement for def-
amation suits involving media portrayals into line with the require-
ment of identifiable harm.
D. The Advantages of the Proposed Principles
On the basis of the two principles identified as guiding court deci-
sions, it is possible to develop a new description of the legal rights of
people portrayed by the media. In essence, it may be said that people
have the right to be protected against media portrayals that both have
an exploitative purpose and cause identifiable harm. To be sure, this
description does not have the stirring quality of a right of privacy or
publicity. But evocative formulations are of value only if one has
decided in advance to champion the right in question, and there is no
apparent reason for such partiality; indeed, in this area of law, the First
Amendment commands that any bias must run the other way.
It may be argued that the concepts of privacy and publicity are
174. See, e.g., Davis v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, Inc., 191 F.2d 901 (8th Cir. 1951); W.
PROSSER, supra note 11, § 111 at 749-51. Cf. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 79-83 (1966)
(high level of identifiability constitutionally required).
175. See, e.g., Lorentz v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, Inc., 155 F.2d 84, 87 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 329 U.S. 727 (1946) (libelous character of statement must be based on "fair and
reasonable import of the language used").
176. See, e.g., Peck v. Tribune Co., 214 U.S. 185 (1909); Wegner v. Rodeo Cowboys
Ass'n, 417 F.2d 881 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 903 (1970); Hinsdale v. Orange
County Publications, Inc., 17 N.Y.2d 284, 217 N.E.2d 650, 270 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1966).
177. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
178. Id. at 349. Since the Court stated that "impairment of reputation and standing in
the community, personal humiliation, and mental anguish and suffering" would still
provide a basis for liability, id. at 350, it probably meant identifiable or recognizable harm
when using the term "actual injury." But cf. Frakt, Defamation Since Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc.: The Emerging Common Law, 10 RUT.-CAM. L. REv. 519, 560-66 (1979) (con-
fusion in lower court cases as to meaning of Gertz damage requirement).
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valuable nonetheless: they are too important, and have become too
familiar, to be abandoned simply because they fail to account satis-
factorily for the particular class of cases that involve portrayals. But
portrayal is not simply a theoretical construct; it is a real issue, char-
acterized by a definable type of media behavior and imposing a de-
finable set of injuries. Moreover, publicity rights are confined exclu-
sively to the portrayal context, while privacy rights, when they go
beyond that context, are little more than distinct concepts combined
under a single name. 79
The more mundane formulation suggested here would solve many
of the problems present in existing case law. To begin with, it would
alter the result in those cases in which the rhetoric of privacy or pub-
licity tends to lead to incorrect decisions. In Commonwealth v. Wise-
man, 80 this new formulation would have made the court much less
likely to issue an injunction against Wiseman's film by focusing atten-
tion more directly on the First Amendment issue that the case pre-
sented. The principle of media purpose would have clearly indicated
that the film was protected expression because there was no media
exploitation involved. The conclusion that a filmmaker exploits wards
of the state by documenting the miserable conditions in which they are
kept is one that few courts would be likely to reach.' 8 '
179. Most of the other uses of the term privacy involve the distinctly different problem
of regulating government, rather than private behavior, see note 42 supra, or, as in the
case of intrusion, involve private behavior that is unrelated to the First Amendment, see
pp. 1583-84 supra.
There are some commentators who would make a different grouping, placing the
revelation of private facts together with government intrusions upon family life and
government disclosures of information. See, e.g., T. EMERSON, supra note 93, at 544-62;
Gerety, supra note 39. Apart from the difficulty of applying equivalent standards to both
public and private agents, this approach suffers from the problem of over-abstraction. It
generally rests on concepts such as autonomy or individuality, see T. EMERSON, supra
note 93, at 455-56; A. WEsrTIN, supra note 103, at 32-39; Gerety, supra note 39, at 281,
concepts that are ultimately no more precise or self-evident than privacy itself. Cf.
Bloustein, supra note 35, at 1000-07 (basing unified idea of privacy on concept of dignity).
It should also be noted that these approaches focus on only one of the elements of the
analysis presented here, namely, the injury to the individual. The other element of this
analysis, the nature and purpose of the agency inflicting the injury, is not adequately
considered. As a result, distinctions that would otherwise emerge, such as the difference
between protected and unprotected speech, become obscured. To use an analogy, one
cannot construct an adequate system of legal remedies based on the mere fact that an
individual was purposely struck; it is essential to consider the identity of the attacker-
whether he was a policeman, a schoolteacher, a private citizen, or a parent-and the pur-
pose of the attack.
180. 356 Mass. 251, 249 N.E.2d 610, cert. denied, 398 U.S. 960 (1969). See p. 1592 supra.
181. In fact, other courts that adjudicated privacy claims against Wiseman's film came
to essentially this conclusion, and refused to grant relief. See, e.g., Cullen v. Grove Press,
Inc., 276 F. Supp. 727 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
Similarly, in Cason v. Baskin, 155 Fla. 198, 20 So. 2d 243 (1944), aff'd, 159 Fla. 31, 30 So.
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Just as the principle of media purpose leads to a more justifiable out-
come in Wiseman, the principle of identifiable harm clarifies recent
case law regarding the question of devisability. A number of courts
have held that a cause of action originating with the individual por-
trayed survives him only if he has contracted for the commercial use of
his attributes during his life. 82 This was the basis on which relief was
granted in Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc.,18 3 one of the Elvis
Presley cases. The court held that the "exclusive right to exploit the
Presley name and likeness, because exercised during Presley's life,
survived his death."'u 4 This result can be reached by applying the
concept of identifiable harm. Once a person dies, to state the obvious,
he is no longer able to earn a livelihood by marketing his attributes.
If he has created a contract, he can leave the proceeds of that contract
to his heirs, and any portrayal that detracts from the value of that con-
tract will clearly injure its beneficiaries. But if no contract has been
created, the identification of such harm is more difficult. Any claim by
a person's heirs grounded in the unrealized potential ability of a person
to profit from his attributes during his lifetime would appear to be too
vague or remote a basis upon which to grant relief.
At least two courts have attempted to create a more expansive doc-
trine of devisability by holding that the right to profit from one's at-
tributes can be inherited, even in the absence of an explicit contractual
right. The decisions in these two cases, Lugosi v. Universal Pictures
Co.'18 and Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc.,186 turn on the assumption
2d 635 (1947), see note 82 supra, exploitation was absent, since the plaintiff's behavior
was portrayed as one part of the author's account of her own past, and was thus clearly
relevant to an informative work. In addition, the behavior was public, so that there was
no identifiable harm. Polakoff v. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 3 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA)
2516 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978), see note 82 supra, would also be decided differently under the
proposed principles. Although the work in question contained fictionalized episodes, these
episodes were apparently identified as such, and were aspects of a larger entertainment
vehicle of recognizable cultural value.
182. E.g., Maritote v. Desilu Productions, Inc., 345 F.2d 418 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 883 (1965); Miller v. Commissioner, 299 F.2d 706 (2d Cir. 1962); Lugosi v. Universal
Pictures Co., 139 Cal. Rptr. 35 (Ct. App. 1977).
183. 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 1215 (1979).
184. Id. at 222 (footnote omitted).
185. 172 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 541 (Super. Ct. L.A. County 1972), rev'd, 139 Cal. Rptr. 35 (Ct.
App. 1977). Lugosi involved a grant of rights provision in a contract between the actor and
the producer of the motion picture Dracula. The trial court, after holding that the grant
was restricted to a single motion picture, went on to argue that the remainder of the
rights, those not covered by the contract provision, had passed to Lugosi's heirs, and that
unauthorized use by Universal clearly injured them. Id. at 551-55.
186. 400 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). In Price, the widows of Laurel and Hardy at-
tempted to enforce an agreement in which Stanley Laurel and Oliver Hardy's widow
granted a producer exclusive rights to use the comedian's attributes in merchandising and
other media. By enforcing the agreement, the district court apparently held that Hardy's
widow had inherited Hardy's right to profit from his attributes, even in the absence of a
specific contract right previously created by Hardy.
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that the right of publicity, being a "property" right, should be devis-
able to the same extent as any other property. But this result conflicts
with the underlying social policies that govern the law of media por-
trayals. The Lugosi and Price decisions would impose a considerable
burden on free expression because they would leave no apparent limits
to the rights a person's heirs could claim. At the same time, they would
have little value in encouraging individual creativity. To give a person's
heirs control over the exploitation of his attributes and his related pub-
licity rights after his death will obviously not encourage that person's
activities. Of course, the possibility of providing for one's heirs may
have a motivational effect during one's life. But given the present state
of the law, it is possible for a person to establish a bona fide contract to
profit from his attributes during his life, and to leave the proceeds to
his heirs. The fact that he did not do so indicates that he was not par-
ticularly concerned with using and devising this asset, and that such
concerns were not a substantial motivation during his life. In that case,
permitting the right to profit from one's attributes to be inherited
would not fulfill the social policy of encouraging individual cre-
ativity.
1s7
The principle of identifiable harm would demand a different result
in the Lugosi and Price cases, a result that is more consonant with
the predominant social policies. This principle would hold that if there
were no pre-existing contract right created during the lifetime of the
person portrayed, his heirs could not make a showing of harm sufficient
to justify recovery.'88 In fact, the courts seem to be moving in this
direction at the present time, as the authority of both decisions has been
undercut. Lugosi has been reversed by an appellate court, 8 9 while the
187. It can be argued that the Lugosi and Price courts were misled by the clarity with
which the rights asserted by the heirs had been defined, and assumed that these rights
were equivalent to rights that had been defined during the person's lifetime and
translated into a contract. Alternatively, the Price court may have been influenced by the
fact that the original grant of rights was made by Laurel himself, although not by Hardy,
400 F. Supp. at 838. It is even arguable that the court was interpreting this contract
as having been executed during the "lifetime" of the comedy team, as represented by one
of it members.
188. A possible objection to this rule is that it could be avoided by a legal strategem:
a person wanting to pass on his right of publicity would need only to execute a contract
granting exclusive rights to his heirs, and then confer this contract on them in his will.
But courts could readily find the contract void as counter to public policy or as illusory
if it were not executed for genuine business purposes. The crucial question is not whether
a person has written a piece of paper and captioned it "contract" instead of "will," but
whether a person has actually developed a bona fide way to profit from his attributes, and
then left the instrumentality for doing so to his heirs.
189. 139 Cal. Rptr. 35, 39 (Ct. App. 1977) (rejecting idea "that because one's immediate
ancestor did not exploit the flood of publicity ...he received in his lifetime for com-
mercial purposes, the opportunity to have done so is property which descends to his
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conclusion in Price was explicitly avoided by the Second Circuit in one
of the Elvis Presley cases.190
In addition to guiding courts toward more justifiable results in cer-
tain cases, the proposed principles provide more coherent predictive
rules for determining potential liability as a result of media portrayals.
By so doing, these principles can eliminate much of the chilling effect
of the uncertainties that presently beset this area of the law.
One advantage of the new principles is that they provide a single
method of analysis for cases involving the portrayal of real people by
the media. The increasingly popular dichotomy between privacy and
publicity rights is a source of confusion, because the distinction between
the two simply does not withstand analysis. In both cases, the legal
right is precisely the same: it is the right to be protected against media
portrayals for exploitative purposes that cause identifiable harm, a
right that combines privacy and publicity considerations. If one has
the right to prevent disclosure of a fact, one can sell that right to some-
one else, who will then publish it. Similarly, if one may sell the right
heirs") (emphasis in original); accord, Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Productions, 140
Cal. Rptr. 775 (Ct. App. 1977) (rejecting right of publicity claims advanced by heirs of
Rudolph Valentino).
190. Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S.
Ct. 1215 (1979). In a footnote to its holding that Elvis Presley's right of publicity survived
his death because it had been exercised during his life, the court said: "Because the right
was exploited during Presley's life, we need not, and therefore do not, decide whether the
right would survive the death of the celebrity if not exploited during the celebrity's life."
Id. at 222 n.11. But cf. Price v. Worldvision Enterprises, Inc., 455 F. Supp. 252 (S.D.N.Y.
1978) (holding that decision in Price v. Hal Roach has res judicata effect on producer
attempting to use rights acquired from original defendant to produce television series
based on Laurel and Hardy routines). Worldvision does not constitute a reaffirmation of
the original Price decision on the devisability issue, however; if the Worldvision court
felt that res judicata applied, if was compelled to follow the decision in Hal Roach,
regardless of the merits. See RSTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMIENTS § 68 (Tent. Draft No. 4,
1977).
In Hicks v. Casablanca Records & Filmworks, 464 F. Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), a right
of publicity suit brought by Agatha Christie's heirs against a fictionalized motion picture
account of her eleven-day disappearance in 1926, the court said that the right of
publicity was inheritable because Agatha Christie had "'exploited'" her name during
her lifetime, primarily by publishing literary works. Id. at 429-30. The court relied upon
Factors for the conclusion. In Factors, however, the portrayal impinged upon a specific
contractual right that Elvis Presley had created and transferred, while in Hicks, the
portrayal merely depicted someone who had transferred contractual rights in certain
literary works, but had not attempted to grant rights for the use of her name or per-
sonality as such. Thus, Hicks fails to meet the test of identifiable harm. It seems clear,
however, that the Factors case is of greater precedential weight. Not only is it the decision
of a higher court, and the sole basis for the reasoning in Hicks, but the Hicks discussion
of the devisability issue did not control the decision in the case. The court held that
the portrayal in question was protected by the First Amendment, and was thus immune
from liability regardless of the plaintiff's rights.
1620
Media Portrayals
to exploit one's attributes, one may also refuse to sell that right, and
thus keep it private.19 1
In addition to uniting those cases currently decided on privacy or
publicity grounds, the principles of media exploitation and identifiable
harm also relate both groups of cases to the libel cases involving media
portrayals. As indicated above, many recoveries for libelous portrayals
can be explained on the ground that the portrayal caused identifiable
harm without serving a valid social purpose.19 2 The more traditional
concepts of privacy and publicity offer no such link to libel law. Libel,
while it can involve statements about private behavior, just as fre-
quently involves statements about public political activities or business
affairs that are in no sense private, and is often far removed from the
type of economic loss that would sustain a right of publicity claim.
The proposed principles serve as better predictive rules not only
because they represent a unified approach to the issue of media por-
trayals, but also because they establish a clear analytic process through
191. Several of the leading right of publicity cases have involved people who wanted
to restrict, as well as to profit from, the right to publicize their attributes. See, e.g.,
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 563-64 (1977) (effort to prevent
televising of human cannonball act); Cepeda v. Swift & Co., 415 F.2d 1205 (8th Cir. 1969)
(effort to restrict authorized use of name to athletic products); Rosemont Enterprises, Inc.
v. Random House, Inc., 58 Misc. 2d 1, 294 N.Y.S.2d 122 (Sup. Ct. 1968), aff'd mem., 32
A.D.2d 892, 301 N.Y.S.2d 948 (1969) (effort to use right of publicity to prevent publication
of any biography).
In fact, the entire distinction between personal rights and property rights, which serves
as the conceptual basis of the distinction between the rights of privacy and publicity, is a
somewhat dubious one. Modern property comes in many forms that could readily be
regarded as personal, such as licenses, franchises, and government benefits. See Reich, The
New Property, 73 YALE LJ. 733 (1964). As the Supreme Court said in Lynch v. Household
Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972):
[The dichotomy between personal liberties and property rights is a false one.
Property does not have rights. People have rights. The right to enjoy property with-
out unlawful deprivation, no less than the right to speak or the right to travel, is in
truth a "personal" right, whether the "property" in question be a welfare check, a
home or a savings account.
192. In the area of defamation, the proposed principles could replace vague terminology
with a clearer method of analysis. While defamation itself is a viable concept, the impact
of the First Amendment in this area has led to a distinction between public and private
figures that is notable for its obscurity, thereby causing the very "chilling effect" that New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), was designed to avoid. See id. at 279. The
proposed principles would eliminate the need to rely on this distinction and possibly
lead to more reasonable decisions. See notes 140 & 142 supra. Instead of focusing on the
nature of the person portrayed, the new approach would begin by focusing on the degree
of exploitation involved in the portrayal. If a defamatory portrayal exploited the in-
dividual by creating a false link between him and a valid public issue, it would be
potentially subject to liability for negligence; otherwise, only a knowing falsehood would
suffice for liability. The second step of this new approach would be to determine whether
any identifiable harm has occurred. This is related, at least in instances where the
negligence standard applies, to the "actual injury" requirement of Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974).
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which the result can be obtained. Privacy and publicity are ultimately
slogans, rather than decisionmaking criteria; once these terms are in-
voked, it is not at all clear how they should be used, what elements
comprise them, and how those elements are to be ordered. The proposed
principles establish a two-step process. The first step is to determine
whether the portrayal in question is exploitative, using criteria relating
to the perceived social value of the type of portrayal involved. If the
portrayal is found to be exploitative, the next step is to determine
whether the plaintiff has suffered any identifiable harm, of either an
economic or a dignitary nature. If both these criteria are satisfied, it is
likely that a court will grant recovery. To be sure, most courts do not
use these principles explicitly, but the principles do serve as a means
of explaining court decisions, and their organization in a logical order
renders them a workable predictive device.
In addition to establishing a clear analytic process, the proposed
principles possess greater predictive power because they incorporate
the First Amendment directly into the analysis. The privacy and
publicity approaches begin by ignoring this constitutional command,
and then must reintroduce it through the use of vague terms such as
"newsworthiness," conclusory arguments based on waiver principles,
or unnecessarily elaborate balancing formulae. 193 That the First
Amendment does not regularly fall victim to this process is a testament
to the high value generally accorded to it. What clearly does fall victim
to the indirectness of the present approach is the clarity and predict-
ability that is so crucial in this area.
By developing rules that directly incorporate First Amendment con-
cerns, the proposed principles make clear, in a way that concepts
such as privacy and publicity do not, that the right of individuals to
exercise control over media portrayals of themselves is a limited one.
A person can prevent exploitative portrayals, provided that he can
demonstrate that the portrayal will cause identifiable harm to his
economic or his personal interests. But if the portrayal serves a
recognized social function of an informative or cultural nature, then
any harm he suffers will be beyond the reach of legal remedy. We are
willing to tolerate this situation because of the value we attach to
general benefits that the media provide. And in a system that also
values the rights of individuals, we justify this choice with the con-
viction that any harm a person suffers is recompensed by the preserva-
tion of a greater general freedom.
193. See pp. 1584-88, 1590-91 supra.
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